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When I was in active practice, there was an appellate judge who said:
"I'm sorry I had to rule against you, but when you have friends on both
sides, you just have to follow the law." That statement illustrates one
problem, particularly with rule interpretation and elected judges in the
diverse State of Texas. It reflects the potential alteration of a rule in the
name of "doing justice" meaning the judge chooses to do.
Likewise, I heard an appellate judge say, "Don't bother me with a bunch
of authorities. If I want to rule for you, I will find authority to cite." That
statement further illustrates a deeper problem-the law can be
manipulated to support any desired outcome.' This is most frustrating to
lawyers who are well-prepared, know the law, present the law, and have it
ignored. When courts publish opinions reflecting this attitude, students
often become frustrated or conclude that the law is whatever the judge
decides it should be. This idea follows them into their practices and
beyond if those students become the judges of the future.
This Article does not focus on unethical judges who decide cases for
wrong motives but, rather, focuses on ethical judges who are faced with
"hard" (as distinguished from "easy") cases and have the dilemma of
having to decide the case, either by the rule or by the judge's concept of
fairness. The two situations (wrong motive or hard case), however, are
1. Roscoe Pound, in his article, Mechanical Jurisprudence, brought this concept to prominence.
Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); see also Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's
Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 518 (2006) (equating "what we would call today
'legal formalism[]"' with "what Pound called 'mechanical jurisprudence"). I am, to an extent,
changing his meaning of the term "Mechanical Jurisprudence" because this Article relates only to the
working rules of trial and appellate procedure.
2. This Article is written primarily in the context of Texas law and the examples discussed
below arise from the same. The law of other jurisdictions could just as well have been chosen, but
the problems are similar regardless.
3. Judges who decide cases, as illustrated by these two quotes, forget "an extremely important,
even a defining, element of the judicial protocol[,] ... what Aristotle called corrective justice. That
means judging the case rather than the parties, an aspiration given symbolic expression in statues of
justice as a blindfolded goddess and in the judicial oath requiring judges to make decisions without
respect to persons. It is also the essential meaning of the 'rule of law."' Richard A. Posner, The Role
oftheJudge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2006) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 47:569572
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related. In both instances, the judge or judges may ignore or refuse to
apply a plainly written rule.' If it is proper in the hard case, why isn't it
proper to disregard the language of a procedural rule anytime a judge
chooses, "for the sake of justice," to ignore the rule? It is the purpose of
this Article to propose a set of standards that may be used in hard cases
and may demonstrate the impropriety of ignoring a rule when the case is
not truly hard.
So what is a hard case? For the purposes of this Article, "[a]n easy case
is one where the applicable law is clear; a hard case . . . is one in which a
number of rules could arguably be applied."'
If this were a philosophical work, I would pursue the broad question of
the nature of judicial obligation. But this is only a modest exploration of a
few Texas Civil Procedure questions. The fact that it does touch on
judicial obligation and judicial ethics is, in one sense, coincidental and, in
another, the purpose of the Article.
None of the examples below are intended to imply that political
motivation led to the action of the court in the cases used to illustrate the
problems. However, it should be recognized that every time a court
condones or authorizes a deviation from the published rule, the
motivation of the court may not be as pure as in the cases to be discussed.
B. Proposed Practical Consideration-A Set of Standards
This Article proposes a set of standards by which any dilemma of rule
interpretation can be resolved. This proposal will be viewed by some as a
4. "Yet appellate court judges take the same approach with alarming frequency when
confronted with interminable volumes of precedent. Rather than carefully investigating and
understanding those authorities, many judges react by determining the "correct" decision and either
utilizing snippets of supporting case law or ignoring prior decisions altogether." Michael Gentithes,
Precedent, Humility, and Jusice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 836 (2012).
5. Brent D. Lloyd, Toward a Pragmatic Model of Judidal Dedsionmaking: Why Tort Law Provides a
Better Framework than Constitutional Law for Deciding the Issue of Medical Futility. 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
603, 622 (1996) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Juriprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 833
(1988)); see also Gregory B. David, Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe v. Wade, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1221, 1224 (2004) ("In the past thirty-five years, two important but fundamentally different legal
theories have attempted to address the philosophical question of the nature of judicial obligation.
The first approach is modern positivism, best represented by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz.
According to this view, a judge is obligated to apply the rules that the legal system recognizes as law.
Such law might derive from precedent that judges establish or rules that the legislature or some other
lawmaking body creates.... [A] rule does not always determine how a judge should decide a case.
When this occurs, the judge's decision involves an exercise of discretion because the law poses no
obligation to decide the case one way, rather than another." (footnotes omitted)).
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move to formalism.' That may be true, but this proposal only applies to
rules of procedure and is elastic in nature.
Using suggestions from H.L.A. Hart's proposals (slightly modified),
primary and secondary rules are identified for resolution of the dilemma of
deciding hard cases-that is, the need for justice and the need for clear
and understandable rules of procedure. Integrating a proposal from Lon
Fuller, which identifies eight routes to the failure of a legal system, this
Article proposes a set of flexible standards to be considered when
resolving any dispute between a published rule and a perceived injustice
resulting from the application of a rule. With due apologies to Hart and
Fuller, these standards or rules can be referred to as "The Elastic
Standards for Resolving a Dilemma in Applying Rules of Procedure to
Achieve Justice." As modified for this Article, these elastic standards are
as follows:
(1) Lacuna: Is there a lacuna or vacancy in the law that justifies the
judicial examination, variation or proposed resolution? If so, and the
circumstances are extraordinary or the position of litigants will not be
altered, it is proper to make the change to do justice.
(2) Publication: Is it a single correction of the rule, by published or
unpublished opinion? Or, will the resolution be published to affect
future litigation? If it is a single correction, it may be justified if
extraordinary circumstances demand it. If it impacts all future
litigation, it should not be made.
(3) Ambiguity: Will resolution of this dilemma be clear? Or, will it be
unclear and create an ambiguity in the law? If it does create
ambiguity, will the variations be published and made known as a Rule
of Law? There should be no ambiguities in the rules of procedure.
(4) Retroactive: Is it retroactive legislation by opinion? There should
be no generalized retroactive rule changes by opinion, even when
made to accomplish "justice." The Supreme Court of Texas is
responsible for issuing the rules of procedure. It is not proper for a
rule-making/legislative body to make ad hoc changes to the rules
(legislation) which that body promulgates.
(5) Contradictions: Will the resolution create a contradiction between
the published result and the published rule? There should be no
contradiction between published rules and the changes effected by a
published opinion wherein the court is "doing justice."
(6) Undue Burdens: Will the resolution create unreasonable demands
on the litigants or the courts-that is, demands beyond the power of
6. Richard A. Posner, The jurprudence ofSkepidsm, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 831 (1988).
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either litigants or the courts? If it does, the rule should be applied as
written. Resolution of dilemmas should not create burdensome
demands on the litigants or the courts.
(7) Instability: Will the resolution create instability in the law? If
instability will be created by the proposed action, the court should
simply follow the published rule.
(8) Divergence: Is the resolution a generalized divergence from the
published rules? There should be no generalized divergence between
published rules and published opinions altering those rules.
C. Recognigng the Problems ofJudging
Hopefully most judges follow the mandate of the rules of procedure
and seek to apply them in a way that will "obtain a just, fair, equitable[,]
and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants";' in other words, in a
way that will accomplish justice, whatever "justice" is.
This Article is written for attorneys, judges, and those who teach law-
particularly procedure-not for those who write in the difficult and deep
areas of abstract philosophy. Those writing in the area of philosophy'
have long-range and long-lasting influence on the fashioning of
substantive law and in areas of ambiguous laws or decisions. Those
philosophers, however, generally deal with concepts, issues, or statutes,
and not with the interpretation of rules of procedure. This Article does
import concepts of H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, but it does so with
modifications to fit the situations discussed below.
Procedural rules exist to be followed as they are written unless they are
ambiguous, circumstances warrant flexibility to accomplish "justice," or
both. But few of the rules of procedure are ambiguous. These rules
develop over time, and ambiguities, if present, are, with few exceptions,
eliminated or dealt with through "safety procedures" or amendments.
Occasionally, however, circumstances do exist that make judges
uncomfortable with the literal application of the rules. This Article deals
with such situations.
This Article posits these questions: When is that flexibility (departure
from the literal wording of a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure) warranted?
What happens when the application of a rule seems to cause a perceived
7. TEx. R. CIV. P. 1.
8. But it should be remembered that "legal philosophy concerns itself with fundamental
problems of legitimacy." Stephen M. Richman, L.gal Philosophy: A Palmpsest N.J. LAw., Oct. 2000,
at 10, 15.
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unjust result? Is it necessary to seek alternate interpretations, especially
when some interpretations have better consequences than others as
posited by Richard Posner?'
In each of the rules to be discussed, there is no question of ambiguity or
any need for entering the labyrinth of concepts of interpretation of the
wording of the rule."0 Rather, each of these rules is well thought out,
definite in its meaning, and yet, in a given case, is perceived to cause a
need for interpretation. On the other hand, the Texas rules are clearly
intended to be construed so that they do "justice."" So, in any given case,
the question becomes, is the deviation from the rule an attempt to do
justice? Or, is it the product of a political choice or an attempt to aid a
friend or a client who is not properly represented by their attorney? But
how is one to tell? This is the dilemma. This Article attempts to provide
elastic standards for resolution rather than the ad hoc rule interpretations
discussed below.
To some legal philosophers, such as the realist, attitudinalist,"
functionalist, and the judges influenced by them believe there is no "easy"
case. Rakesh K. Anand concluded, however, that
[t]his denial of the 'easy' case did not itself render legal certainty entirely
elusive. Judicial decisions were, to an extent, predictable. To make sense of
predictability, however, required jurisprudence to move beyond a rule-
governed order and conceive of the judicial decision as a "social event:" .....
The social determinants of a judicial decision included both the personal
history of the judge and the larger history of society.... For the
functionalist, rules fell out of the jurisprudential equation.1 3
Whether the functionalist-realists-pragmatists or the formalists are
right, the problems and temptations of those applying the rules are great,
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 105 (1990).
10. See general Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theoy of Intetpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277
(1985) (surveying various concepts of legal interpretation).
11. TEx. R. Civ. P. 1.
12. "At the opposite extreme from formalism is "attitudinalism." At its crudest, this is the idea
that judges and Justices simply vote their political preferences, so if you know whether they are
Democrats or Republicans you can predict their decisions; a more refined version substitutes
ideology for party affiliation." Posner, supra note 3, at 1052.
13. Rakesh K. Anand, Contemporay Cidl Lizgation and the Problem of Professional Meaning: A
JurisprudentialInquig, 13 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 75, 92 (1999) (footnotes omitted). For other related
articles, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935), Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Funcional Juriprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5 (1937), Karl
Llewellyn, A Reaisie Juriprudenc-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), and Roscoe Pound,
The Callfor a ReahstJuisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
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and this must be recognized. As Judge Posner stated, "The principal
conceptions of the judicial role are the points of an equilateral triangle.
They are formalism, politics, and pragmatism. Formalism is the
conventional, one might say the official, conception of the judicial role.""
Judges have a hard job in all cases, but particularly when deciding hard
cases. Most do it with integrity and honor, but all are influenced by
different factors.
The judges of all the courts in Texas are elected and must regularly
stand for reelection. They are chosen from the community they serve and
have past connections with the lawyers and, possibly, with litigants who
come before them. The judges depend on those appearing before them
for campaign contributions. Additionally, each judge has his or her own
beliefs, prejudices, and educational background, and may, at some time,
have to return to the practice if they retire or happen to be defeated.
Other than having personal connections with parties or lawyers, some
of the factors that may influence a judge in arriving at a decision are so
diverse that they are almost impossible to comprehend.'" Some of the
factors" that should be considered when determining how and why a
judge will rule are beyond the scope of this Article. However, judges
should be conscious that each of the factors may influence their decisions
when resolving procedural dilemmas. It seems proper to point out all the
many forces that may be at work when a judge decides a case.'7  These
factors include the following:
14. Posner, supra note 3, at 1051.
15. See general/y Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head. Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow
Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 911 (2015) (suggesting decisions by judges are susceptible to
emotional reactions).
16. There is virtually no limit on the variables that could be considered in examining the
process of judicial decision-making. Richard A. Posner suggests:
Problems of jurisprudence include whether and in what sense law is objective (determinate,
impersonal) and autonomous rather than political or personal; the meaning of legal justice; the
appropriate and the actual role of the judge; the role of discretion in judging; the origins of law;
the place of social science and moral philosophy in law; the role of tradition in law; the
possibility of making law a science; whether law progress; and the problematics of interpreting
legal texts.
POSNER, supra note 9, at xi.
17. See generally Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2001) (examining the
various factors that may influence judicial decision-making, including personal attributes (age, gender,
race, religion), social background (education, prior judicial experience, prior prosecutorial experience,
prior public/elected office), and policy preferences (legal doctrine, appointing president, party
affiliation)). Of these he found age, religion, and prior judicial experience to be insignificant; and the
party affiliation and the appointing president to be the strongest influences. Id. at 37 tbl.3.
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(1) educational background of the judge(s)"-Was the judge
educated in-state or out-of-state? Was the judge educated at an elite
or non-elite school?19  How removed from the educational
experience is the judge? And, what was the nature and scope of the
education?20
(2) practice background of the judge(s);2 1
(3) political party of the judge(s);
(4) personal experience of the judge(s);2 2
18. See Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges'Attributes and Case Characterieics: An Alternative Appmach
to Explaining Supreme Court Dedsionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277, 278-79 (1988) (describing how
educational status has been analyzed by factoring "the prestige of justices' pre-law educations and the
prestige of the law schools they attended"); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Bindng and Theory
Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460,
463, 468 (1991) (factoring in social class, as derived from education, when setting forth "[a]
[p]ersonal [a]ttributes [t]heory of Supreme Court j]ustice [vloting [b]ehavior"); see general4 S. Sidney
Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 957 (1986) ('The most
ambitious of these [social background model] studies ... has reported... from 70% to 90% of
variance in the voting of Supreme Court justices in a 30-year period was accounted by seven
variables[, including] . . . prestige of prelaw education . . . .").
19. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Currnt Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
42-44 (1994) (noting a study found "merit-selected judges are less likely to have attended college in-
state and are less likely to have been born in-state" (citing Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert,
Selection Systems and judicial Characteristics The Recmitment of State Supreme CourtJudges, 70 JUDICATURE
228, 231 (1987))).
20. See Cynthia Stevens Kent, Daubert Readiness of Texas Judiiary: A Study of the Qualfications,
Experience, and Capadiy ofthe Members ofthe TexasJudidaU to Determine the Admissibiliy ofExpert Testimony
Under the Daubert, Kelly, Robinson, and Havner Tests, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1999)
(concluding Texas judges are ill-prepared to serve as gate-keepers of expert testimony).
21. See J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Commentary, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533, 542 (1995)
(acknowledging a judge's law practice as a criteria factored by biographers).
22. See James J. Brudney et al., Judidal Hosiity Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1763 (1999) (applying the "social
background model" of empirical studies to one area of the law (the NLRA)). The authors concluded:
[OJur study supports the need for further inquiry into the forces that shape judicial conduct.
We are in the midst of a spirited debate between appellate court judges and scholars about the
relevance of a judge's political affiliation in predicting votes. Such disagreements hould not
obscure the importance of developing more sophisticated analyses of other judicial background
factors, and of exploring the possible relationships between those factors and specific aspects of
legal doctrine. Additional research is especially timely as the federal bench becomes steadily
more diverse in a number of demographic and socioeconomic respects.. [I]n the years
ahead, social background factors will assume an increasingly meaningful role as indicators of
judicial voting behavior.
Id at 1765 (footnote omitted). "The central trait which we seek in judges and the central prerequisite
for doing their work well-fairness-is not acquired through professional training, but in personal
experience." Louis E. Newman, Beneath the Robe: The Role of Personal Values in Judicial Ethics, 12 J.L. &
RELIGION 507, 529 (1995-1996).
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(5) prior judicial offices held by the judge(s);2 1
(6) future political aspirations of the judge(s);
(7) age of the judge(s);
(8) gender of the judge(s);2 1
(9) length of tenure of the judge(s);
(10) method by which the judge was selected;25
(11) family circumstance of the judge(s);
(12) the influence of staff-staff attorneys, research assistants,
briefing attorneys, and interns;
(13) the influence of one judge on another, or one group of judges on
another judge or judges,26 including the absence (or presence) of
23. Professors Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew D. Martin argue
all norms that cut against diversity are problematic because they reduce the ability of the
decision-making group (the Supreme Court not excepted) to perform its tasks. We further
argue that the norm of prior judicial experience is particularly troublesome for two reasons.
First, since virtually all analyses show career path to be an important factor in explaining judicial
choices-from the votes justices cast to their respect for stare decisis-the homogeneity
induced by the norm suggests that the current Court is not making optimal choices. Second,
since women and people of color are less likely than white men to hold positions that are now,
under the norm of prior judicial experience, steppingstones to the bench, the norm is also
working to limit diversity on dimensions other than career path.
Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 905 (2003); see also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Poltics and the judiciary:
The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273-74 (1995) (reviewing
"[c]haracteristics used by prior scholars [to] examine the effect of judicial background on court
decisions," including whether a judge had been an elected office holder); Brudney et al., supra note 22,
at 1704 (stating a variable used for "reporting the professional experience of each judge" included
"whether a judge ever held elected office").
24. See Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891,
897-98 (1995) (examining gender distinctions among the behaviors of female and male judges and
finding, from empirical studies, "only slight, if any[,] differences between the overall voting behavior
of male and female judges along the dimension of gender"); see generally Megan G. Mayer, Note, In re
Marriage of Iverson: Dubious Benefits in RedAcingJudicial Gender Bias, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 105 (1993)
(detailing an appellate court's reversal of a case after finding evidence of the trial court judge's gender
bias).
25. See Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection
Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25, 29 (1979) (illustrating the
various methods of judicial selection of judges used by all the states in their court of last resort).
26. See Michael R. Murphy, Collegialy and Technology, 2J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 455, 457-61
(2000) (discussing collegiality among appellate judges as fragile and delicate to communication tools,
such as teleconferencing and e-mail); Francis P. O'Connor, The Art of Collegiakliy: Creating Consensus and
Coping nith Dissent, 83 MASS. L. REV. 93, 93 (1998) (asserting dissent among judges is entirely
consistent with collegiality, thereby, not affecting a judge's decision-making); see also Harry T.
Edwards, The Effects of Collegiaty on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1639, 1689 (2003)
(concluding "collegiality mitigates judges' ideological preferences and enables [them] to find common
ground and reach better decisions").
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judges with diverse points of view;2 7
(14) political pressures of the time;
(15) the cases that are, or are not, brought before the court;
(16) the judge's own perception of how cases are to be decided;2 1
(17) the effect of prior decisions on the court or on an individual
judge in the case before the court (the effect of stare decisis);2 1
27. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177 (1921)
(arguing "out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and
uniformity and average value greater than its component elements"); see also Harry T. Edwards,
Collegiady and Decision Making on the D.C Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1361 (1998) ("A court
composed of judges with a diversity of different professional experiences and perspectives makes for
better-informed discussion."); Harry T. Edwards, The Judidal Function and the Elusive Goal ofPrinciled
Dedsionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 852 (commenting the process of decision-making is not
subject to enmity, even when a court's panel is "mixed"); Harry T. Edwards, Race and the juidag,
20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 325, 329 (2002) (noting "racial diversity on the bench can enhance judicial
decision[-]making by broadening the variety of voices and perspectives in the deliberative process"
and "reminds judges that all perspectives inescapably admit of partiality"); Harry T. Edwards,
Reflections (on Law Renew, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mate), 100 MICH. L. REV. 1999,
2006 (2002) (describing the benefit of collegiality as enhanced performance without acrimony from
the perspective of a D.C. Circuit's former chief judge).
28. See Mark C. Modak-Truran, A PragmaicJusificaion ofthe Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
55, 56 (2001) (examining the various theories of legal decision-making, in the context of "argu[ing]
that William James's pragmatism provides a compelling epistemological justification for the hunch
theory of judicial decision[-]making and saves the hunch from arbitrariness"). Compar RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255 (1986) ("Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide
hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the
best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their community."),
with Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The 'Eay Case" of the Under-aged President, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 250, 252 (1989) ("Deconstructionists say that all interpretation depends on context. Radical
deconstructionists add that, because contexts can change, there can be no such thing as a single
interpretation of any text that is absolute and unchanging for all time.").
29. According to Youngsik Lim, Supreme Court decision-making analysis is divided:
Most studies of Supreme Court decision[-]making can be divided into these two groups-the
legal model and the attitudinal model. The legal model argues that the decisions of the Supreme
Court are based on the facts of the case, the precedents, the plain meaning of statutes and the
Constitution, and the intent of those who framed legal provisions. In contrast, the attitudinal
model holds that the Supreme Court justices decide a case in light of their ideological attitudes
and values.
Youngsik Lim, An EmpiricalAnalsis of Supreme Court Justices' Dediion Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721,
722 (2000). For her first proposition, Lim cites to Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm ofStare
Dedsis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 (1996), Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole
Stog: The Impact ofJustices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049 (1996),
and SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS (1995). For her second proposition,
Lim cites to DAVID W. ROHDE & -IAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
(1976), JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993), and Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Deisis on the Votes of
United States Supreme Court justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (1996). See also Andrew P. Morriss,
Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Prinales and Case Studies of the
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(18) the willingness of the judge or judges to state the reasons for the
decision in question;30
(19) the religion of the judge;3 '
(20) time pressures on the judge;
(21) the judge's own perception of self-worth;3 3
Decline ofEmployment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1002, 1020-56 (1995) (identifying areas
where researchers must make decisions upon examining the common law, given its iterative nature).
According to Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss,
Legal concepts, lines of precedent, and doctrinal themes may not be sufficient for
understanding judicial decision[-]making, but they are surely essential. Legal analysis, as a
distinct method of human reasoning, cannot be reduced to any methodology borrowed from
another discipline. The judge brings to bear "not only a range of personal and political
preferenceso but also a specialized cultural competence-his knowledge of and experience in
'the law."' Backgrounds will vary, attitudes will differ, environments will change, but the law
remains the alpha and omega of judicial decision[-] making.
Gregory C. Sisk, et al., Chardog the Influences on the JudidalMind An Empirical Study ofjudicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1500 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Richard A. Posner, What Dojudges
andjustices Maximie? (The Same Thing Eveybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 24-25 (1993)).
30. Frederick Schauer notes:
Sometimes people who make decisions give reasons to support and explain them. And
sometimes they do not. The conventional picture of legal decision-making, with the appellate
opinion as its archetype and "reasoned elaboration" as its credo, is one in which giving reasons
is both the norm and the ideal. Results unaccompanied by reasons are typically castigated as
deficient on precisely those grounds. In law, and often elsewhere, giving reasons is seen as a
necessary condition of rationality. To characterize a conclusion as an lOse di.it-a bare assertion
unsupported by reasons-is no compliment.
The conventional picture, however, may be mistaken. Like voters who simply say aye or
nay, like publishers and journal editors who turn down submissions without explanation, like
employers and admissions officers who send rejection letters that announce outcomes without
providing justifications, like homeowners who rarely explain to the painters and carpenters
whose proposals they have rejected why someone else was chosen, and like referees in sporting
events who make calls that are ordinarily unsupported by explanations, many decision[-]making
environments eschew the very feature that the conventional picture of legal decision[-]making
takes as an essential component of rationality.
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 633-34 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
31. See Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on the Bench: The Role of ReZgious Belief in the Criminal Sentencing
Dedions of Judges, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 41 (2000) (arguing "[tlhere is a role for faith on the
bench"); Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Relgious Values in judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 487
(1993) (asserting "the inclusion of religious values in the law-making process can be justified");
Newman, supra note 22, at 508 (stating judges "have the opportunity to draw upon personal
(including religious) values in reaching a decision" (footnote omitted)).
32. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Juddal Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001)
(asserting "judges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions").
33. SeeJames L. Gibson, Persona6y and Elite Pofitical Behaior The Influence of Self Esteem on judcidal
Decision Making, 43 J. POL. 104, 123 (1981) (collecting research indicating that a judge's perception of
self-worth may have an influence on decision-making).
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(22) ethnic background of the judge;`
(23) the judge's cognitive ability;" and
(24) the era (time) in which the judge sits on the bench;3 6
34. See Peter A. Lauricella, Chi Lascia la Via Vecchia per la Nuova Sa Quel Che Perde e Non SaQuel
Che Tmra: The Italian-Armerican Experience and Its Influence on the Judicial Philosophies offustice Antonin Scaha,
judge Joseph Bellacosa, and judge Vito Titone, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1701, 1726 (1997) ("Litigants have many
factors to consider when they face a judge, including the judge's 'likes and dislikes, the predilections
and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make
the man.' These, as we may or may not realize, appear to be influenced by ethnic heritage." (quoting
CARDOZO, supra note 27 at 167)); see also George A. Martinez, LegalIndeterminag, JudicialDiscredon and
the Mexican-American litzgation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555, 613 (1994)
(chronicling support for the assertion that judges are influenced by their own points of view and
preconceived ideas).
35. See Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis ofJudicial Decision-Making: How Judges Use the
Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 1, 67-68
(1998) ("A social cognitive framework has been used to examine the potential for bias in the
nature of the categories of information that judges use to make decisions. Human cognitive
'processes guide decision[-]making and personal perceptions and are heavily influenced by
culturally determined expectancies.' Thus, where judges have a great deal of discretion awarding
custody, the potential for bias is great because the judges' own conceptions of what an adequate
parent is may be based on their own racial-ethnic background, subsequently influencing their
findings."); see also Evan R. Seamone,JudiiaMindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2002) ("In
this Article, I establish a theory of 'judicial mindfulness' that would guard against wo types of
'cold' bias when interpreting legal materials. The first harmful bias involves traumatic past events
that might unknowingly influence judges when they decide cases that are reminiscent of the
trauma. The second harmful bias involves the elimination of valid legal theories or the
interpretation of ambiguous phrases to mean only one thing, thus motivating premature decision-
making. Judicial mindfulness is attainable when judges implement two psychological techniques
that fit within psychologists Wilson and Brekke's general framework for correcting instances of
mental contamination: (1) negative practice and (2) transitional or dialectical thought. These
systems alert judges to their biases by allowing them to understand how they arrive at decisions,
and then offer a framework that analyzes the processes they employ to achieve legitimate legal
conclusions."); Dan Simon, A Psychological Model ofJudiial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18
(1998) (advancing a psychological approach to "investigate the cognitive operations" of judicial
decision-making).
36. One commentator notes:
According to Cardozo, judges are not to incorporate into the law their own aspirations,
convictions, and philosophies but those of "the men and women of [their] time." Yet, Cardozo
understood that the distinction between the judge's personal predilection (the subjective view of
decision-making) and the judge's view of the community's convictions (the objective view of
decision-making) may be blurred. He wrote that
[t]he spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in
which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.
No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of these
subconscious loyalties.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the _Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965, 983-84 (1993)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting CARDozo, supra note 27, at 173-75).
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But should each, any, or all of these factors justify the judge's decision
to depart from clearly established, clearly written law (as discussed here,
rules of procedure)? This Article asserts the answer should be "no" in the
context of the application of clear procedural rules unless some
extraordinary factor or factors require a departure and that departure will
not significantly harm the established procedural system or the opposing
party.
With all these factors at play, it is amazing that there is any uniformity in
decision-making in any area in Texas or elsewhere. The judicial system,
with the pressures of judicial differences, is structured to allow great
flexibility in the trial courts, leaving the parties charged with protecting
themselves from errors by the judges." With these different influences at
work on judges and with the built-in flexibility of the procedural system,
there is a great danger that a few judges will misuse the rules of procedure.
The Texas appellate courts exist at the intermediate level to correct
preserved errors found to be harmful." The Supreme Court of Texas
exists to review certain types of cases and "any other case in which it
appears that an error of law has been committed by the court of appeals
and that error is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the state that,
in the opinion of the supreme court, it requires correction," thus unifying
the answers to issues of law that are fundamental to the jurisprudence of
the state.3
The Supreme Court of Texas is also charged with writing the Texas
Rules of Procedure40 for both the trial courts and the appellate courts.
The judges of the appellate courts, as well as those of the trial courts, face
many of the pressures mentioned above." Of these, the greatest pressure
is political-in either the partisan sense or in the sense of philosophical
leaning.42
The Texas Rules of Procedure are more rigid and formal, in general,
37. See Guthrie et al., supra note 32 at 784 (concluding judges err in their decision-making, but
the courts, legislatures, and litigants are able to, and do, react to mitigate the effects of judicial errors).
38. TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 22.201(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("The state is divided into
[fourteen] courts of appeals districts with a court of appeals in each district.').
39. Id. § 22.001 (West 2004) (outlining the Texas Supreme Court's jurisdiction).
40. See Bruce L. Dean, Comment, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifing the Juddar's Power to Promulgate
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 139, 140 (1988) ("[Tjhere has been a national trend toward
shifting the responsibility for court rule-making power from the state legislatures to their respective
judicial branches, which Texas has joined.'.
41. See Guthrie et al., supra note 32 at 779-80 (discussing influences on judges).




than the Federal Rules of Procedure-as they should be in light of Texas's
elective judicial selection.4 ' However, some formalized flexibility is built
into the rules at most critical junctures.
The debate between natural law, formalism,4 5 realism,4 6 positivism,
pragmatism, and the later theories of legal philosophy may, or may not,
have traction in matters of substantive law and general governance4 7 but
not in resolving most procedural matters.
Procedure,4 8  as that term is used here, in one way or another, is
involved in every case. Procedure can be referred to as "adjective" law,49
43. See Dean, supra note 40, at 157 (asserting "to understand the past and future of rule-
making" in Texas, one must acknowledge the judiciary as a separate and elected body).
44. See id. at 165 ("Courts in these jurisdictions [where courts promulgate rules of procedure]
are able to respond immediately and with flexibility to current problems. . .
45. Discussing legal formalism, Arrie W. Davis notes:
Classical formalism, at its core, is generally understood as the "traditional" or "conventional"
conceptualization of appropriate judicial decision-making. Sometimes described as a
"Langdellian" approach to legal reasoning, formalism treats the law as a set of scientific
formulae or principles that are derived from the study of case law. These principles create an
internal analytical framework which, when applied to a set of facts, leads the decision-maker,
through logical deduction, to the correct outcome in a case. Defenders of formalism posit that
it "proffer[s] the possibility of an 'immanent moral rationality' based on careful study of the
law."
Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy, and the Role of a Judge.- The Senate Confirmation
Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 9-10 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism On the Immanent Raionali of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950, 953-54
(1998)).
46. "Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1) a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial
decision, according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered discretion, in order (3) to reach results
based on their personal tastes and values, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with
appropriate legal rules and reasons." Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturaiged
Juriprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 268 (1997).
47. See Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 779 (discussing "various schools of [legal] thought"
providing different explanations for judges' biases in their decisions).
48. Discussing the role of procedure, Charles Rhodes notes:
The objective of any lawsuit is to establish an enforceable right. By definition, procedure, which
is the judicial process for enforcing rights recognized by the substantive law, is inherent in every
civil action and implicated in each civil appeal. Indeed, almost all appellate opinions scrutinize
procedural issues to some extent, at least to delineate the governing standard of review.
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Ciil Procedure, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 685, 685 (2002) (footnote
omitted).
49. Discussing the origins of the procedure-substance dichotomy, D. Michael Risinger writes:
The procedure-substance dichotomy is different from the right-remedy distinction. The
dichotomy was fathered by Jeremy Bentham in a 1782 work entitled OfLaws in General, sub nom
the distinction between substantive law and adjective law. Bentham there makes clear that he
believes he is drawing a new distinction in the descriptive organization and analysis of the
[Vol. 47:569584
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since it may impact, or modify, every area of the law that becomes
involved in litigation.5 0  In some instances, it is a matter of pure
procedure, relating to everything from instituting a suit; defining the nature
of pleadings; describing the parties who may be sued; establishing the
venue of the action, the nature, scope, and form of discovery, the charge
to the jury (if there is one), and the entry of the judgment; and etermining
the rights of the parties. In other instances, it defines the scope of review;
or, it may define the scope, manner, and nature of "the judicial process for
enforcing rights recognized by the substantive law."5 1  Procedure controls
the future of various classes of litigation.5 2  However, shifting
interpretation of procedural rules makes it easier for competing political or
philosophical points of view to impact the result of the judicial decision-
making process, as between the interests of litigants.5
"Procedure is an instrument of power that can, in a very practical sense,
generate or undermine substantive rights."5 4 Texas, for example,
concept of law, and an examination of the leading pre-Bentham sources on English legal theory
supports his claim.
D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Prcedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional
Problems of 'Irrebuttable Presumptions", 30 UCLA L. REV. 189,191 (1982) (footnote omitted).
50. See Cas. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Salinas, 333 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. 1960) (considering adjective
law to be procedural (citing James P. Hart, Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Texas, 29 TEX. L.
REV. 285, 297 (1951))); see also George W. Barcus, Appellate Court Procedure, 7 TEX. L. REV. 107, 107-
111, 113 (1928) (outlining the procedure for appealing a case to the Texas Supreme Court and
condemning "too much overlapping in getting a case from the trial court through its final disposition
in the [s]upreme [c]ourt").
51. Rhodes, supra note 48, at 685.
52. See Schauer, supra note 30, at 654 (stating precedent allows judges to affect future cases that
they are presently unable to fully understand).
53. According to Paul MacMahon,
Procedural questions are important in any legal system, but they often dominate legal debates in
the United States to a puzzling extent. As Robert Kagan says, "[c]ompared to other
economically advanced democracies, American civi[c] life is more deeply pervaded by [legal]
conflict and by controversy about legal processes." Regardless of the content of their views on
procedure, Americans consider procedural issues to be centrally important. In the depth of
their absorption with procedural questions, American lawyers and legal scholars appear to
diverge from many of their foreign counterparts.
Paul MacMahon, Proceduralism, Ciil Jusice, and American Legal Thought, 34 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 545, 547
(2013) (quoting ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3
(2001)); see also David Peeples, Lawsuit Shaping and Legal Suffidengy: The Accelerator and the Brakes of Civil
Litzgation, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 341-42 (2010) (discussing the concepts of "legal sufficiency,"
"lawsuit shaping," and "judicial boundary-setting" in the context of procedural evolution "[fjrom the
rigid common-law forms of action to the Field Code of 1848, to the Federal Rules of 1938 and the
Texas Rules of 1941").
54. Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV 801, 802
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experienced rapid swings in political views between 1978 and 1992,
making it a fertile area for philosophical discussions.55  As explained by
Professor Michael Ariens, "Since 1960, our modern civil liability regime
has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among the most dramatic
ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system."5 6  Procedure was
often the vehicle for politically and economically motivated change in
Texas in the 1980s and 1990s.
Abstractly and aspirationally (without reference to what really occurs),
procedural law should be non-political and neutral-a steady rock in a sea
of social, economic, and political foment.s" But this is not to say that
procedural rules should remain static. Rather, again, abstractly and
aspirationally, changes should be considered and made with deliberation.
The procedural rules of court should not, however, be a means of
accomplishing broad economic or social change." This is not a reference
to constitutional or statutory interpretation; it is only a reference to the
"rules of the road" of the courthouse.
(2010).
55. In the final chapter of James L. Haley's book, The Texas Supreme Court: A Narrative Histog,
1836-1986, he reviews " The Court in Flux":
[T]he increasingly political tension on the [c]ourt was apparent when Raul Gonzalez, who was
uncomfortable with the result [in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354
(Tex. 1987)], asked what could justify repudiating such a recently decided precedent, and Oscar
Mauzy offered "the voters of this state" as authority for taking the [c]ourt in a new direction. It
was a stance that would have horrified previous generations of justices respectful of stare
decisis.
JAMES L. HALEY, THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT: A NARRATIVE HISTORY, 1836-1986, at 216-17
(2013) (footnote omitted).
56. MICHAEL ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 267 (2011).
57. There are recognized arguments against this point of view: "Just as anti-matter is an
expression of matter[] and atheism is arguably a form of religious belief, many courts and
commentators have philosophized that neutrality constitutes a form of political opinion." Mark G.
Artlip, Comment, Neutrality As Political Opinion: A New Asylum Standardfor a Post-Elias-Zacarias World,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 559, 559 (1994); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 486 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing to affiliate
with a particular political faction." (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cit.
1984))); see also Robert G. Miller, Machiavellian Justice: A Response to 'Law, Morakly, andJudicial Decision-
Making," 65 TEx. B.J. 916, 917 (2002) (discussing "result-oriented jurisprudence" and "how to
balance stability against flexibility" in the context of stare decisis); Panel Discussion, Poiica/Aspects of
Appellate Law, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1137, 1137-62 (1999) (debating political influences on procedure
and the judicial system); Rhodes, supra note 48, at 685 (2002) (surveying how the Fifth Circuit
addresses a variety of procedural issues).
58. See Ozan 0. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1673, 1687-93 (2015)
(describing three particular ways in which the judiciary influences the political realm and operates "as
a tool of stealth authoritarianism").
2016] THE DILEMMA OFIINTERPRE77NG RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 587
In this area of procedural law, formalism, with some elasticity, seems to
be the appropriate approach to interpretation. It is recognized that this is
contrary to the view of many writers,s9 but in light of the Texas
experience of wide swings in the views held by the members of the
Supreme Court of Texas, it seems the safer course is to follow the rules as
written, with some clearly delineated elasticity. It is the nature of the
elasticity that is the subject of this Article.
D. The Hart-Fuller Debate"o
In discussing the "troublesome" decisions, the debate between H.L.A.
Hart' and Lon Fuller,62 which prompted the writing of this Article,
illustrates the problem." Hart examined a rule banning vehicles in any
public park.6" He sought to illustrate the difference between the core
meaning of laws or rules, the problems associated with the use of the rules
in hard cases, and the development of penumbral meanings. As a
positivist, he saw that rules have core meanings but recognized the hard
59. One writer contends:
American proceduralism is closely related to the history of American legal thought, in general,
and to the rise of Legal Realism, in particular. The more obvious place to seek the origins of
American proceduralism is the Legal Process movement that flourished in the 1940s and 1950s.
But we gain a deeper understanding of the character of American proceduralism by looking
back further, to the Legal Realists. I show that, as part of their embrace of an instrumental
approach to legal justification, and their skepticism about the determinacy of substantive law,
the Realists themselves called attention to the significance of procedure. Their work then
provoked a proceduralist response in the shape of Legal Process thought. Through the
intellectual descendants of the Realists and Legal Process theorists, the strongly proceduralist
element in American legal thought lives on today.
MacMahon, supra note 53, at 549 (footnote omitted).
60. For a full discussion of the two positions, see generally Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide
to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008).
61. For an excellent biography of Hart, see generally NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART:
THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004). See also Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart,
119 HARv. L. REV. 852, 863-64 (2006) (reviewing LACEY, supra) (discussing the debate between
Fuller and Hart).
62. For a biography of Fuller, see generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984).
63. See H.L.A. Hart, Positiim and the Separaion of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 627-
29 (1958) (rebutting Fuller's "distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be"); see also Lon
L. Fuller, Positiism and Fideity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631 (1958)
(responding to Hart).
64. See Hart, supra note 63, at 607 ("A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public
park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles?
What about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called 'vehicles' for the purpose of the rule or
not?'.
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cases at the edge of the rule's intent. He argued morality was not
necessary to the application of law, at least in core cases, but not that
morality was never an issue in rule application.6 s He did argue that
sentences, not words, should be the focus of interpretation.66
Hart wrote there are "primary rules," which govern social conduct (e.g.
criminal laws), and "secondary rules."6  He broke the "secondary rules"
into three categories: rules of recognition6 ' (used to discover the primary
rules), rules of change6 9 (used to create or change primary rules), and rules
of adjudication"0 (used to determine whether rules have been violated and
the penalty for any violation).
He advocated for an 'external' jurisprudence [that] distanced itself
from any legal system's law practice and asked a general question of social
science, namely, [W]hat sort of a social practice is law?"" Ronald
Dworkin, following in the footsteps of Fuller, advanced a form of
"internal jurisprudence," which also asks the question, "[What is law?"
However, the question is posed from a practical standpoint. It is asked
"from the standpoint of a judge within thi legal system, or of a lawyer
who must argue to such a judge, what are those standards that the role of a
legal professional obligates one to follow in his decisions."7
Fuller," a natural law advocate," responded to Hart with a question
65. See Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition, 52 SMU L. REV.
75, 75 (1999) (stating Hart was clearly attempting to "refocus the postwar debate over positivism').
Sebok continues, noting Hart's lecture "dealt with challenges to positivism based on its alleged
connections with a variety of unpopular jurisprudential views" and that "Hart challenged the claim,
made by many, that there was a necessary relationship between positivism and Bentham and Austin's
command theory,' Langdellian formalism, and Nazi totalitarianism." Id.
66. See Schauer, supra note 60, at 1122 ("An automobile is plainly a vehicle, Hart argues, but the
fact that what counts as a vehicle in ordinary language is (usually) the same as what counts as a
vehicle in legal language does not mean that law is committed to the ordinary meaning of ordinary
terms.').
67. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (2d ed. 1994) (describing "primary rules of
obligation" and their prohibition against behavior that harms the community).
68. See id. at 94 (showing how rules of recognition act as a solution for uncertainty).
69. See id. at 95 (explaining how rules of change address "the static quality of the regime").
70. See id at 96-97 (demonstrating how rules of adjudication are a response to problems of
inefficiency).
71. Michael S. Moore, Legal Prinaples Revisited, 82 IowA L. REV. 867, 868 (1997). See general/
HART, sfpra note 67, at 98 (arguing primary rules combined with the structure of these secondary
rules are "the heart of a legal system").
72. Moore, supra note 71, at 868; see also HART, supra note 67, at 95 (illustrating the inception of
a legal system "in embryonic form" that provides the foundation for "the idea of legal validity").
73. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 181 (1964) [hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY OF
LAW]; see Anthony D'Amato, Lan Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 AM. J. JURIs. 202, 202 (1981)
(disagreeing with Professor Robert Moffat's description of Fuller and arguing aspects of "Fuller's
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about mounting a truck on a monument as a war memorial: Would it
violate the rule against a vehicle in the park?"
Subsequently, in explaining his concept of law, Fuller posited eight
routes to the failure of any legal system:
(1) the lack of rules or law, which leads to ad-hoc and inconsistent
adjudication;
(2) failure to publicize or make known the rules of law;
(3) unclear or obscure legislation that is impossible to understand;
(4) retroactive legislation;
(5) contradictions in the law;
(6) demands that are beyond the power of the subjects and the ruled;
(7) unstable legislation (e.g. daily revisions of laws); and
(8) divergence between adjudication (or administration) and
legislation.
According to Fuller, law is meant to "subject[] human conduct to the
governance of rules."7 7 If any one of the eight principles is missing within
any governmental system, the system is not "morally legal."78 Hart argues
Fuller's eight principles are merely matters of efficiency, not morality.7 9
The Hart-Fuller writings have generated much debate. While useful,
they are difficult to apply within a state procedural system.so Their debate
theory ... actually conflict with substantive natural law"). But see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and limits
ofAdjudcation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Forms and Limits] (discussing the
"process of conversion" of principles and rights in mundane settings as well as before an arbitrator);
Robert C.L. Moffat, The Perils of Positvism or Lan Fuller's Lesson on Looking at Law: Neither Science nor
Mystey-Merey Method, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 333-34 (1987) (debating whether Fuller's
views aligned with natural law or positivism and emphasizing the "perception of fluid processes" as
Fuller's unique contribution to theories of law and morality).
74. See Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflectons on Public Philosophy,
Juriprudence, andLegalEthics, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1339,1354 (2006) (describing Fuller as "the most
influential of the twentieth century natural-law scholars").
75. Fuller, supra note 63, at 663 (ruminating on the interaction between a situation where "some
local patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the park a truck used in World War II" and Hart's
hypothetical ban of vehicles in the park).
76. See FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73, at 33-38 (illustrating, through his story of
Rex, the eight ways to fail in lawmaking).
77. Id. at 106.
78. See id. at 39 (proposing the eight principles are essential and necessary, and suggesting "[a]
total failure in any one of" the principles will produce a regime "not properly called a legal system at
all"); see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 347 (1983) (identifying the
eight ideals that "a system of rules should strive to satisfy").
79. See H.L.A. Hart, The Moraity of Lu,, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1965) (reviewing
FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73) (arguing a moral perspective of Fuller's eight principles
"breeds confusion" and advancing a pragmatic approach based on "the efficient execution of" rules).
80. Reflecting on the complexities of the procedural system and the impact of the Hart-Fuller
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essentially involves the separation of law and morality and the
interpretation of statutes or rules. In the context of the problems
discussed in this Article, the procedural rules in question relate to the
resolution of conflict in the trial and appellate courts, and they are clear.
The issue is whether to ignore or bypass the clearly stated rule.81
This Article recognizes the philosophical problem inherent in defining
"justice" by mentioning the Hart-Fuller debate, and the writer is cognizant
of the potential criticism that other schools of philosophical thought are
not pursued. But this Article, inspired by reading the Hart-Fuller
discussion, is intended to be a discussion of the adjective law of procedure,
not one of substance or philosophy. Much of their discussion relates to
statutes, but rules of procedure, once adopted, "have the same force and
effect as statutes."82
1. Primary Versus Secondary Rules of Texas Civil Procedure
Hart's writings lead, not directly but by analogy, to the conclusion that
some procedural rules that state the direct rule of procedure should be
treated as primary to those-most significantly Rule 1-that allow
modification of the primary rule." Modifying rules, such as Rule 1, will
debates, Frederick Schauer notes:
Once we see how often law is formal, and once we see how often (especially in the United
States) it is not, we can appreciate that the best understanding of rule interpretation in particular,
and an important part of law in general, may come neither exclusively from Hart's example of
the automobile, nor from Fuller's counterexample of the military truck. Rather, we learn a great
deal from the conjunction of both examples and both sides, and from an appreciation that each
of the two examples captures an important feature of the legal systems we know best. To the
extent that this is so, the real winner of the debate is not Hart, nor is it Fuller, for both
neglected something important. Instead, insofar as the two perspectives complemented each
other and remedied the too-narrow descriptive account of the other, the real winner turns out
to be all of us.
Schauer, supra note 60, at 1134.
81. For a deeper discussion of Fuller's theories, see generally Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuler's
Theory ofAdjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Pubc Law Models of(fitgation,
75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995).
82. In e City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. 1973)); see Freeman v. Freeman, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex. 1959)
("Our Rules of Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes."). Stare decisis should control
decisions on rules. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. 2006) (acknowledging stare
decisis is most potent "in cases construing statutes" but extending the doctrine to an agency policy
because "it was the next thing to [a statute]" (citing Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins., Co., 530 S.W.2d
138, 141 (Tex. App-San Antonio 1975, writ rePd) (interpreting a homeowner's insurance policy))).
83. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Power to the People: The Takings Clause, Hart's Rule of Recogniion, and
Popukst Law-Making, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 87, 90-91 (2011) (noting primary rules "dictate
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be referred to, for the purposes of this Article, as secondary rules. Thus,
in the discussion that follows, Rule 1, which mandates the courts do
justice, is not primary to the specific rules of procedure but, rather, is
secondary to those rules."
2. Using Secondary Rules to Control Primary Rules Is Suspect
Fuller's discussion, while more general, leads to a conclusion that the
application of secondary rules to control primary rules are often suspect.
Fuller-concepts lead to the development of standards to provide tests for
determining the validity (or a court's interpretation) of rules. These
concepts may be refined in the future but, for now, will be adopted to
illustrate this discussion.
The purpose of the proposal in this Article is to recognize different
levels of procedural rules, depending upon the purpose of the rule. Some
of the issues discussed below include, but are not limited to, whether the
rule is outcome determinative and whether the "crisis" requiring a
proposed departure from the rule is the result of the party's action or is
due to an outside event or force.
Rules that relate to due process issues and the initiation of a civil action
should be analyzed and construed differently from rules relating to the
conduct of a trial, an appeal, or both. While the concept discussed here
could be applied to the litigation system of any state, this Article focuses
on the conduct of trials and appeals in Texas.
E. The General Rule Used to Construe Rules
Two lines of discussion are required. One relates to the mandate to the
courts found in a secondary rule, such as Rule 1:
The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair,
equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under
established principles of substantive law. To the end that this objective may
be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense
both to the litigants and to the state as may be practicable, these rules shall
certain behavior patterns," such as prohibitions, while secondary rules "confer power" such as
requiring two witnesses to render a will signing valid).
84. Some may argue Rule 1 should be the primary rule; however, it only comes into play after
the primary rule is found to create a problem. Therefore, it only modifies the specific rule in rare
situations. See FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73, at 82 (describing appropriate judicial
interpretation).
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be given a liberal construction.8 5
The other relates to specific issues, such as Rule 5, a primary rule, which
prohibits the enlargement of time.8 6 The built-in elasticity of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for error correction at every step of
the litigation process, must be examined to understand the reluctance to
treat secondary rules, such as Rule 1, as overarching and controlling in
those cases perceived to be hard.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure are constructed in such a way as to
grant guaranteed rights of procedure to all litigants in the same sense that
drivers on a highway are assured that other drivers (at least in the United
States) will drive on the right side of the road." In trial, however, it is the
duty of a party to call attention to any deviation from the rules through
timely, contemporaneous preservation of error." Judges, while they do
police trials, are not forced (placed at risk of reversal) to act until a mistake
or deviation from the rules has occurred during a trial and is called to their
attention.9 0 Once error is preserved through some form of objection,"
85. TEX. R. Civ. P. 1. ChiefJustice Hecht has, in particular, emphasized this rule:
Procedural rules exist to subserve the presentation and resolution of cases on their merits....
This court has labored long and hard to remove as many procedural traps from our rules
as possible. Litigants are entitled to have their disputes resolved on the merits, not on
unnecessary and arcane points that can sneak up on even the most diligent of attorneys.
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 69 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J., dissenting)
(quoting Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 643 (Tex. 1989)). In the
words of Chief Justice Hecht, "Tricky procedural rules threaten substantive rights." Id. at 74 (citing
Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J.,
concurring)).
86. TEx. R. Civ. P. 5.
87. See id. R. 1 ("The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair,
equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of
substantive law.'.
88. See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 760 (Tex. 2013) (noting "the
party waives any subsequent alleged error" by failing to immediately object or request a limiting
instruction).
89. See Punch v. Gerlach, 263 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1954) ("The spirit of the rules is to charge
the attorneys of the litigants with the responsibility of preserving the legal rights of their clients in the
progress of litigation by timely action.").
90. See general# TEx. R. App. P. 33.1 (outlining the rules of preservation); TEX. R. EVID. 103
(stating how a party may preserve error when evidence has been admitted or excluded); see also In r
L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 708 (Tex. 2003) ("In [an action to terminate parental rights], adhering to our
preservation rules isn't a mere technical nicety; the interests at stake are too important to relax rules
that serve a critical purpose. . . . '[Aippellate review of potentially reversible error never presented to
a trial court would undermine the Legislature's dual intent to ensure finality in these cases and
expedite their resolution."' (quoting In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003))); Bushell v. Dean,
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the complaining party is entitled to a new trial if that party loses, appeals,
and the subject of the objection is found to be erroneous and harmful.92
But how do judges or courts resolve the dilemma and deal with
situations when a rule of procedure produces a result that is viewed to be
"unjust" or, at least, unsatisfactory? As seen by the examples discussed
below, the Texas Supreme Court has taken different approaches in
different situations and in different periods of time. In some instances the
rule may be amended, ignored, interpreted, or reinterpreted. Not only is
there a danger of favoritism but also, when the language of a rule is
unchanged but is reinterpreted to reach a currently perceived just result,
the next judge or court composed of different judges may choose to apply
the rule as written, forget the reinterpretation, choose to ignore the
reinterpretation, or, again, reinterpret the rule another way. More
significantly, attorneys relying on the rules of procedure may not find or
understand the reinterpretation. Whether this harms the attorney depends
on how the rule is reinterpreted.
803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) ("[To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a
party must present to the trial court a timely[, contemporaneous] request, objection[, or motion,
state the specific grounds therefor, and obtain a ruling."); David F. Johnson, Preservation ofErnr and
Standards of Review Regarding the Admission or Excusion of Expert Testimonj in Texas, 48 S. TEX. L. REV.
49, 52-53 (2006) (detailing the ways in which a party may inform the trial court of the error); Sean M.
Reagan, Recurring Themes in Preening Error in Civil Cases, 22 APP. ADvOC. 392, 392 (2010) ("[he
concept that a party must make a timely objection is fairly straightforward and simple black-letter
law.'.
91. The objection may be to evidence, argument, conduct, judicial action or inaction, special
appearance, motion to change venue, objection to charge, receipt of charge, post-verdict actions, and
any other procedural or substantive mistake made by the trial court.
92. See Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. 2008) (stating an
"[e]rroneous admission of evidence is harmless unless the error probably (though not necessarily)
caused rendition of an improper judgment"). The court continues, recognizing
"the impossibility of prescribing a specific test" for harmless-error review, as the standard "is
more a matter of judgment than precise measurement." A reviewing court must evaluate the
whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the "state of the evidence, the
strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992); then
quoting Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131,144 (Tex. 2004); and then quoting Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. 1979))); Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989) ("[The Supreme Court of Texas] will ordinarily not find reversible
error for erroneous rulings on admissibility of evidence where the evidence in question is cumulative
and not controlling on a material issue dispositive of the case."); 6 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE
A. CARLSON, TEXAS. CIVIL PRACTICE § 3:14 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the effect of error in selecting
the wrong court, one without jurisdiction, and the general remedy that comes along with it-
dismissal of the case).
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F. Examples of Texas Cases Where the Texas Courts Deal with the Dilemma of
Rule Interpretation
Six examples of "interpretations" have been selected to illustrate the
problem-the dilemma of rule interpretation. These examples will be
examined in detail in a later section.
1. Apply the Rule as Written
In Akers v. Simpson,9 3 the court, seeing an unjust result, nevertheless,
applied the rule as written and promptly amended the rule so such
outcomes would not recur in the future.94 This is a "plain meaning," or
formulistic, interpretation of the rules.95 While not per se jurisdictional,
the result of the rule was to place the party in a position of having to
collaterally attack the prior judgment.9' Such a collateral attack is difficult
and would fail because the prior judgment was issued by a domestic court
of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction over the party (a Texas resident)
with no impropriety appearing on the face of the judgment.9 7
93. Akers v. Simpson (Akers l), 445 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1969).
94. See id. at 958-59 (holding Akers was an opposing party under Rule 97 despite the fact that
he had been served with a suit through his employer and had no knowledge of nor gave authorizing
for his employer's attorneys to file an answer in his name); TEX. R. CIV. P. 97 (indicating the rule was
amended on July 21, 1970, the year following the Akers decision).
95. See Murphy v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 965 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("Where a rule of procedure is clear, unambiguous, and specific, we
construe the rule's language according to its literal meaning.'.
96. See Akers 1, 445 S.W.2d at 959 (using Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 97(a) to bar a party's
attempt to assert a counterclaim that was compulsory).
97. See Gus M. Hodges, CollateralAttacks on Judgments, 41 TEX. L. REV. 163, 169 (1962) (noting
the limitation of collateral attacks that "only the record may be considered" and "recitals in the
judgment may not be contradicted by other parts of the record"); see also PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera,
379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. 2012) (holding "a judgment may also be challenged through a collateral
attack when a failure to establish personal jurisdiction violates due process"); Browning v. Prostok,
165 S.W.3d 336, 347 (Tex. 2005) ("An attack on a final judgment, otherwise constituting a collateral
attack, cannot be maintained on grounds that the judgment was obtained through fraudulent conduct
intrinsic to the judgment."); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973)
(stating the rule that a judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction is "not subject to collateral
attack except on the ground that it had no jurisdiction of the person of a party or his property, no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to
act as a court"); Templeton v. Ferguson, 33 S.W. 329, 333 (Tex. 1895) ("[W]here a court of general
jurisdiction, in the exercise of its ordinary judicial functions, renders a judgment in a cause of which it
has jurisdiction, such judgment is never void, no matter how erroneous it may appear from the face
of the record or otherwise to be."); Crawford v. McDonald, 33 S.W. 325, 328 (Tex. 1895) (describing
the general rule that "where a personal judgment has been rendered against a defendant by a
domestic court of general jurisdiction" and the defendant's property has been taken and sold, the
defendant will not be allowed to make a collateral attack against a judgment, which appears to be
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2. Change the Rule by Interpretation
In Burkitt v. Glenney,9 8 a truly "hard" case, the court found itself in a
position where the rules did not provide sufficient elasticity to deal with an
unforeseen eventuality. The court, without changing the result, assumed
jurisdiction without so stating." This was a jurisdictional error, but the
correction did nothing other than change the notation, which indicates the
Texas Supreme Court's reasoning was based on the merits, not on
jurisdiction as originally indicated.
3. Alter the Rule by Interpretation to Save a Party from an Attorney's
Mistake
In Verburgt v. Dorner'00 the court assumed jurisdiction even though one
of the two steps necessary to do so was not taken. In this instance, the
rule was not changed, and the mistake that had to be corrected was the
fault of the party.'o' This was a jurisdictional error. But ignoring the rule
gave the offending party a chance to continue the appeal.1 02
4. Change the Interpretation (and, Thus, the Meaning of the Rule)
Until a Later Court Changes It Back and Then Solidifies It into a Rule
In dealing with the discovery of the results of investigations following an
incident having the potential to lead to litigation, the Texas Supreme Court
bounced the interpretation of the rules from one extreme in Flores v. Fourth
Court ofAppeals,'0 to another in National Tank v. Brotherton.'04
5. Announce a New Rule by Opinion that "Politically" Affects Cases
void, but because of "public policy the courts, in order to protect the property rights, apply the
rule ... [that] precludes inquiry into facts dehors the record for the purpose of showing the invalidity
of the judgment," resulting in the judgment being held valid).
98. Burkitt v. Glenney, 371 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e).
99. See id. at 413-15 (affirming the trial court's ruling without addressing jurisdiction).
100. Verburgt v. Dorner (Verburgt ll), 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997).
101. See id. at 616 (attributing the mistake to the appellant's attorney).
102. See id. at 616-617 ("[W]e have instructed the courts of appeals to construe the [Texas]
Rules of Appellate Procedure reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by
imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule.").
103. See Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 39-41 (Tex. 1989) (orig.
proceeding) (interpreting rules to establish a test for determining whether investigative documents
were prepared in "anticipation of litigation).
104. See Nat'l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)
(reinterpreting Flores and creating a two-prong test-objective, reasonable person and subjective,




In Cavnar v. Qualiy Control Parking, Inc.,1os the Court made judgments a
great investment by determining, without issuing a formal rule, that
judgments should accrue compounded prejudgment interest.
Turning then to rules that affect the outcome of a trial, sudden
reinterpretations resulting in perceived political consequences may cause a
subsequent court to reinterpret and alter the rules. 0 6
6. Rewrite a Rule Without Rewriting the Rule
Finally, in an effort to determine the propriety of rule interpretation,
this Article looks at the court's treatment of the problems associated with
the nature of the jury charge and the ways in which error may be preserved
under complicated rules that are now reinterpreted for simplicity. This
examination deals with Rules 271-279 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. 1 0 7  A number of cases are examined, exploring the ever-
changing attempt to perfect the submission of issues to juries and the
problems of preservation of error in the proposed charge of the court.
G. Changing the Rights of ltigants with Court-Created Procedural Devises: Case
Law Wlithout Promulgating a Rule
In Cavnar, the Texas Supreme Court made a procedural change by
imposing prejudgment interest upon judgments without adopting a rule,
and without legislative input.1 0 This action created havoc within the
personal injury field and was subsequently reversed in Johnson & Higgins of
Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc.'
II. THE TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ARE FRIENDLY WITH BUILT-
IN ELASTICITY
In taking these few select rules, it is possible to see a continuum of
potential solutions to procedural problems when some circumstance
causes a perceived injustice and the rules do not provide a means for
105. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985), abrogated byJohnson
& Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1998).
106. See, e.g., Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 40-42 (allowing plaintiffs to discover what had, theretofore,
been considered protected work product).
107. TEx. R. Civ. P. 271-79.
108. Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 556.
109. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1988).
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correction.
To fully understand the dilemmas presented, the stage must be set with
a preliminary discussion concerning the ease with which errors are
corrected using existing procedures established by the rules as interpreted
by the courts. This may seem like a digression, but it is necessary to
understand the scope of the problems discussed. It is clear that the rules
and the interpretation of the rules, as they have accumulated over time,
have created a user-friendly system that allows for the correction of
mistakes with relative ease, depending upon when the mistake is caught
and when the correction is sought.
The earlier in the process the problem is found, the easier it is to
correct. If one can picture a container holding a controversy-with the
container wide at the bottom but which narrows to the smallest opening
possible at the top-one would see the nature of the Texas procedural
system and how that system is designed to deal with procedural problems
in contested litigation. It is easy to correct mistakes before judgment
(when in the broad base of the container), harder on appeal in the
intermediate court of appeal (as the container narrows), and difficult in the
Texas Supreme Court (when the container is at its most narrow point).
With such a user-friendly procedural system in place, it does not seem
proper to save parties (or really their attorneys) from mistakes that could
be avoided by taking advantage of the existing "saving" rules in place.
A. Trial Courts
Great flexibility is granted to Texas trial courts in the exercise of their
discretion when applying procedural rules. If a mistake is made" 10 and the
error is promptly"' and plainly" 2 called to the court's attention and a
110. See TEx. R. EVID. 103 (describing the procedure by which a party may claim and preserve
an error in admitting or excluding evidence).
111. See Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (requiring a timely
objection to preserve error for appellate review).
112. See Campbell v. State, 85 S.W.3d 176, 185 (Tex. 2002) (holding an objection insufficient
when it did not specify the statute which authorized the objection and when it did not specify the
"things" prohibited under the unnamed statute); McDaniel v. Yarbrough, 898 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex.
1995) (requiring an objection to "state the specific grounds for the desired ruling if those grounds are
not apparent from the context of the objection" because it will "[allow] the trial judge to make an
informed ruling and the other party to remedy the defect"); Bridges v. City of Richardson,
354 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1962) (per curiam) (recognizing an exception to the rule that a general
objection does not preserve error by noting "a general objection that [something] is immaterial and
irrelevant is sufficient to preserve right of review of error committed in admitting it").
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ruling from the trial court is obtained" or implied, it can be corrected by
the trial judge until the judgment becomes final." That is to say, the trial
court has a period of plenary power' 1 5 over its judgment, and corrections
can even be made after a judgment has been signed and entered. If not
corrected, appeal is the general remedy for correction of the mistake if
error has been preserved.1"c
There exists a broad range of corrections a trial court can make post-
judgment during the trial court's period of plenary power. For example,
the court can grant a new trial, a judgment non obstante veredicto, a remittitur,
or other similar relief."' Until recently, that power was broader; trial
courts could grant new trials "in the interest of justice.""' Now, they
may do so only when there is an announced and detailed reason for such a
new trial."' In other words, a statement by a trial court that grants a new
113. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (emphasizing the necessity of a trial court
expressly or implicitly ruling on a request, objection, or motion to preserve error for appellate
review).
114. See Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996)
(orig. proceeding) (describing the trial court's power to reconsider its judgment and interlocutory
orders "until thirty days after the date a final judgment is signed or, if a motion for new trial or its
equivalent is filed, until thirty days after the motion is overruled by signed, written order or operation
of law, whichever first occurs").
115. Id. at 659 ("Plenary power' is 'that which is "[flull, entire, complete, absolute, perfect,
[and] unqualified."" (first alteration in original) (quoting Mesa Agro v. R.C. Dove & Sons,
584 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.))); see also Deen v. Kirk,
508 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. 1974) (recognizing thirty days after the rendition of a judgment, a court will
lack "jurisdictional power to hear and adjudicate").
116. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (listing the requirements to preserve error so that a
complaint can be presented on appeal); In ir L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003) (explaining the
need for objecting with timeliness and specificity and obtaining a ruling because of the dangers of
allowing an appeal based on unpreserved error).
117. See 5 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 28:44
(2d. ed. 1999) (describing a remittitur as "frequently appropriate when the complaint is that the
verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court," a remedy on which the refusal of a
new trial may be conditioned, and results in a remittance "in an amount, set by the judge, that
reduces the reward to a proper sum that comports with the evidence"); id. § 27:77 ("[U]pon motion
and reasonable notice[,] the court may render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would
have been proper, and ... the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding on
a question that has no support in the evidence." (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 301)).
118. See In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. 2012) (holding "an order
based solely on 'the interest of justice' is insufficient" as is one that "could just as well be construed
as relying solely on 'the interest of justice and fairness"'.
119. See id. at 688-89 (concluding there is no abuse of discretion when a trial court's reasons
for granting a new trial are "specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro
forms template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and circumstances
of the case at hand").
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trial "in the interest of justice" is an insufficient explanation for setting
aside a jury verdict.12 0  There must be an "articulable reason" given for
the new trial:121
A trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as its stated reason for
granting a new trial (1) is a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate
(such as a well-defined legal standard or a defect that probably resulted in an
improper verdict), and (2) is specific enough to indicate that the trial court
did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but rather derived the articulated
reasons from the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand.12 2
However, once jurisdiction is properly passed to the appellate courts,
only those errors that have been properly preserved or are fundamental
may then be considered.123  To pass jurisdiction once a finall25
120. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 215 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding) (directing the trial court to state reasons for refusing to enter judgment because "[b]road
statements such as 'in the interest of justice' are not sufficiently specific"). For more discussion on
the practice of reversing a decision based on the interest of justice, see generally Robert W. Calvert,
In the Interest ofjusice, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 291 (1972).
121. See In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 686 ("[A] trial court's order granting a motion
for new trial must provide a reasonably specific explanation of the court's reasons for setting aside a
jury verdict.").
122. Id. at 688-89.
123. See Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. 2007) (per
curiam) (acknowledging "[e]ven if a trial court errs by improperly admitting evidence, reversal is
warranted only if the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment" and the
reviewing court will "review the entire record and require the complaining party to demonstrate that
the judgment turns on the particular evidence admitted"); Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d
245, 247 (Tex. 1999) ("When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one
motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both sides' summary judgment
evidence and determine all questions presented."); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993) (holding that standing is an indispensable tool for a court when
deciding a case and "is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction" even though standing
was not raised by a party and that is normally fundamental error); Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d
686, 687 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) ("[L]ack of jurisdiction is fundamental error and may be raised for
the first time before [the Supreme Court of Texas]."); Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.
1982) (per curiam) ("Fundamental error survives today in those rare instances in which the record
shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that
interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas."); McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters,
304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. 1957) (per curiam) ("When the record affirmatively and conclusively
shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error
will also be regarded as fundamental.").
124. "After determining that the order may be taken up on appeal, the second and equally
important issue is the timing of taking the steps to bring the order before the court of appeals." Tom
Cowart, The Appellate Clock, 29 ADVOC. (TEX.) 110, 112 (2004). Cowart notes, "This issue is critical
because the court of appeals cannot exercise jurisdiction over an order if its jurisdiction is not
properly invoked. Thus, blowing a deadline in perfecting an appeal is the kiss of death for the
attempt to obtain relief from an adverse order." Id.
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judgment is entered, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty or ninety
days from when the judgment is signed.12 6
Jurisdidional-Plenay Power, Senice, Invoking and Terminating Trial Court
Jurisdiction
In the trial courts, jurisdiction'27 is conferred by filing a pleading and
effecting service upon the defendant.'2 Once jurisdiction is obtained, a
trial court retains jurisdiction until a final judgment is entered and,
thereafter, for either thirty days after the judgment is signed or thirty days
after the last post-judgment remedy is determined'2 9-and longer if a
party does not receive notice of the entry of a judgment.' Once those
time periods pass, jurisdiction over a case in the trial court ends, and a
notice of appeal'"' is required to continue a direct ordinary appeal.'3 A
short extension for the filing of the notice of appeal is possible under
Rule 5 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, with the noted limitation
that a trial court "may not enlarge the period for taking any action under
the rules relating to new trials except as stated in these rules."'
"Judicial action taken after the trial court's plenary power has expired is
void and a nullity."' 3 4 Filing a jurisdictionally necessary document outside
125. Separate rules exist for limited interlocutory appeals and possible mandamus actions.
126. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1.
127. Jurisdiction relates to the power to hear and decide lawsuits. Morrow v. Corbin,
62 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. 1933).
128. State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1960) (orig. proceeding) (requiring jurisdiction
to be "legally invoked; and when not legally invoked, the power to act is as absent as [if] it did not
exist"), overruled on other grounds ly Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Waldron
v. Waldron, 614 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (demanding, to invoke
the jurisdiction of a court, "that persons or property over which the court has potential jurisdiction
be brought before the court by service of process").
129. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329(b) (promulgating the thirty-day time frame within which a motion
for new trial must be filed).
130. McDONALD & CARLSON, supra note 117, § 28:2.
131. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26 (noting a trial court's jurisdiction is terminated upon expiration of
its plenary power).
132. See Elaine A. Carlson & Karlene S. Dunn, Naegating Procedural Mineields: Nuances in
Determining Finaty ofjudgments, Plenay Power, and Appealabilty, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 953, 1016 (2000)
("One party's filing invokes the appellate court's jurisdiction over all parties, but absent good cause,
the court may not grant more favorable relief than the trial court in favor of a party who did not file a
notice of appeal.").
133. TEx. R. Civ. P. 5.
134. Moore Landrey LLP. v. Hirsch & Westheimer, PC, 126 S.W.3d 536, 543 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (first citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per
curiam); then citing In re T.G., 68 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied)); see also Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. 1983) ("The trial court loses
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a mandated timetable-that is, one or more day(s) late-is fatal to
continued jurisdiction.' 3 5
Jurisdiction is a matter of power; but even here, there is a built-in
flexibility in the trial courts of Texas.
The elasticity of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as construed by the
courts, is illustrated by the ease with which default judgments can be set
aside and clerical mistakes corrected, and by the cushion that is built in for
missed deadlines and delayed mail.' 3 6
plenary jurisdiction [thirty] days after judgment in the absence of a timely filed motion for new trial,
so any action taken after the expiration of [thirty] days from judgment would be a nullity."), overruled
inpart by Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003).
135. See TEX. R. App. P. 2, 25.1(b), 26.3 (promulgating the rules for perfecting and timely filing
an appeal); see also In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 570 (Tex. 1998) (stating when a trial court's
plenary power expires, any judgment from the trial court is void); Verbuigt II, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617
(Tex. 1997) (discussing timing requirements for filing notice of appeal); Levit v. Adams, 850 S.W.2d
469, 470 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (stating ninety-first-day notice under Rule 306a is one-day too late);
Harris Cty. Toll Rd. Auth. v. Sw. Bell Tel., LP, 263 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2006) ("The time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional in nature, and absent a timely filed
notice of appeal or extension request, we must dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction."), afd,
282 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2009).
136. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 5 (providing mail that is "properly addressed and stamped and is
deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not
more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time").
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1. Example-Setting Aside Default Judgments
The clearest example of the friendly nature (the elasticity) of Texas's
procedural rules is its handling of default judgments. If a party fails to
answer a citation and a default judgment is taken, it is possible to set that
judgment aside with ease, if done in time.' 37 If the party does not act within
time for a new trial in the trial court, it may seek a reversal by restricted
appeal within six months.'1s Failing that, one more difficult procedure
remains: the bill of review.' 3  That formalized procedure is allowed for
four years.14 0
2. Correction of Clerical Errors''
137. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939) (analyzing the
conditions upon which a default judgment may be properly set aside).
138. TEx. R. App. P. 30.
139. See Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998) (defining a bill of review and
listing the three factors that allow a judgment to be set aside by a bill of review); State v. 1985
Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) ("[T]his court has enunciated
in specific detail the steps necessary to be followed in a bill of review proceeding."); Transworld Fin.
Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. 1987) (discussing the narrow grounds upon which
a bill of review can set a judgment aside); Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)
(stating "Texas courts have enunciated several requirements that must be satisfied" in filing a bill of
review); Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1975) (orig. proceeding) (explaining a bill
of review is an original proceeding, separate and distinct from the underlying judgment).
140. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (West 2015) (noting the four-year,
residual statute of limitations); Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 538 (providing the residual statute of
limitations applies to bill of review actions).
141. The failure to pay a filing fee is similar to a clerical error but is not separately discussed.
The Texas Supreme Court has dealt with this problem in a proper fashion. See Tate v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 934 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (holding payment of fee is sufficient
before trial court loses plenary jurisdiction). The filing of a post-judgment motion without paying the
filing fee results in the extension of the trial court's plenary power, thus extending the appellate
timetable if the filing fee is paid within the period of plenary power. See id. at 84 ("We held that a
motion for a new trial tendered without the necessary filing fee is nonetheless condidonally filed when it
is presented to the clerk, and that date controls for the purposes of the appellate timetable."). The
failure to pay the filing fee before the motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law may
forfeit altogether the movant's opportunity to have the trial court consider the motion. However, the
court failed to express an opinion on whether the failure to pay retroactively invalidated the
conditional filing for purposes of the appellate timetable. That was laid to rest, and properly so, in
Garga v. Gania. Garza v. Garcia 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. 2004). There, "Garcia timely filed a motion for
new trial[J but never paid the fee." Id. at 37 (footnote omitted). The court held motion for new trial
extends appellate timetables, even if the requisite filing fee is never paid:
We construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberally, so that decisions turn on substance,
rather than procedural technicality; nothing in those rules requires a fee to accompany a motion
for new trialfl or that such a fee be paid at all. Moreover, once a motion for new trial is
conditionally filed and timetables extended, all litigants benefit from knowing what timetables
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Again, elasticity is shown by the ease with which clerical errors,' -2 as
opposed to judicial errors,' in a judgment may be corrected at any
time.'4 4  If it becomes obvious on appeal that a court has made a clerical
error-such as entering the wrong cause number-in an otherwise
properly identified appeal document, such a correction will be allowed."'
The rules relating to nunc pro tunc correction of judgments, in reality,
extend the trial court's plenary power for an indefinite period, but only to
apply even if they do not know whether the requisite fee was paid. The alternative would breed
uncertainty, as the deadlines might automatically jump forward when the fee is quietly paid or
revert backwards if it is not.
This is not to say filing fees are irrelevant.... "[A]bsent emergency or other rare
circumstances[,]" a motion for new trial should not be considered, until the filing fee is paid.
Here, Garcia's factual sufficiency complaint had to be raised in a motion for new trial, but
because she never paid the $15 fee, the trial court was not required to review it. As her
complaint was never properly made to the trial court, it preserved nothing for review; thus, tite
court of appeals correctly never addressed [Garcia's] factual sufficiency complaint[ but correctly
considered her venue complaint.
Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted).
142. See Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (emphasizing a nunc
pro tunc judgment may only be entered to correct a clerical error not a judicial error).
143. See Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986) (reiterating once a trial court's
plenary power has expired, it may only modify a judgment to correct a clerical error); Wallace v.
Rogers, 517 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evaluating the
differences between clerical and judicial errors).
144. See Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970) (orig. proceeding)
(outlining the timing when clerical errors may be corrected).
145. The Texas Supreme Court has had no problem, in the last thirty-plus years, correcting
obvious attomey-party mistakes that do not reflect a lack of intent to act. In City of San Antonio v.
Rodgue, the appealing party placed the wrong cause number on the notice of appeal; all other
information was correct. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 417 (Tex. 1992) (per
curiam). While the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme
Court reinstated the appeal:
We have held that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal when the appellant files
an instrument that is "a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction." More
recently, we reaffirmed the policy that "the decisions of the courts of appeals [should] turn on
substance rather than procedural technicality." Here, there can be no doubt that the [c]ity's
attempt to perfect an appeal was "bona fide" because, but for the erroneous cause number, the
[c]ity's notice of appeal complied with the provisions of Tex. R. App. P. 40(a)(2). We hold that
the [c]ity's notation of the incorrect cause number on its notice of appeal does not defeat the
jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
Id. at 418 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. S. Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); and then quoting Crown Life
Ins. v. Estate of Gonzales, 820 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)). This was akin to the correction
of a clerical (as opposed to a judicial) error in a final judgment, which may be made even after pleaary
power has otherwise expired.
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correct the clerical errors.146 Any nunc pro tunc corrections are subject to
appellate review.14 7  This nunc pro tunc power, however, does not
reawaken the entire case for review--only the clerical mistake is subject to
correction.14 8
B. Appellate Courts.-Jurisdictional Power-Invoking and Terminating Appellate
Jurisdiction
Once a timely notice of appeal is filed, jurisdiction passes to the
appellate courts. Normally appellate courts may only alter a trial court
judgment or remand when harmful error is found to exist on appeal;'4 9
although in extremely rare circumstances, the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure allow for the reversal of errorless judgments when it is in the
interest of justice.'so
"When reversing the court of appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court
may, in the interest of justice, remand the case to the trial court even if a
rendition of judgment is otherwise appropriate.""' One such exception
exists when remand is allowed in the interest of justice because the law
changes pending the appeal or as a result of the appeal.'52
When a plaintiffs judgment is reversed for legal insufficiency, the
appellate court is required to render a take-nothing judgment.'
146. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 329(b)(f ("mhe court may at any time correct a clerical error in the
record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316, and may also sign an order
declaring a previous judgment or order to be void because signed after the court's plenary power had
expired.'".
147. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 230 (Tex. 1986) (conducting appellate review of nunc pro tunc
order).
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329(b)(h).
149. TEX. R. App. P. 44.1; see Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex.
1992) ("As a general matter, when we sustain a no evidence point of error after a trial on the merits,
we render judgment on that point."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 621 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1981)
(per curiam) ("[A]bsent circumstances of additional evidence to be developed or uncertainty of the
decree, the appellate court has a duty to render the judgment which the trial court should have
rendered.'"; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3 (stating when an appellate court should render a trial court
judgment); id. R. 60.2 ("The [s]upreme [cJourt may reverse the lower court's judgment in whole or in
part and render the judgment that the lower court should have rendered.").
150. For a more detailed discussion of the "interest of justice" exception, see generally Calvert,
supra note 120.
151. TEX. R. APP. P. 60.3.
152. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 258 (Tex. 2004) ("The most compelling
case for [a remand in the interest of justice] is where we overrule existing precedents on which the
losing party relied at trial." (alteration in original) (quoting Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448,
455 (Tex. 1992))), abrogated ly Costal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
153. See Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)
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However, even there, an exception has been judicially created to apply
when both post-answer and no-answer default judgments have been
reversed on appeal for legally insufficient evidence.1 5 4
The appellee will be required to perfect an appeal if the party seeks to
alter the trial court's judgment.15 5  In passing on the appeal, any
procedural problems must be dealt with by the appellate courts before
moving on to substance, if substantive matters are even reached.
Normally, there is no difficulty with rule interpretation when a plain
reading approach is used. However, if circumstances cause a perceived
injustice and the rules do not provide a means for correction, the courts
must determine what o do. Several such situations and their solutions are
dealt with here.
III. EXAMPLES OF WAYS RULES HAVE, OR HAVE NOT, BEEN
INTERPRETED TO Do JUSTICE
A. Apply the Literal, Plain-Meaning Language of the Rule and Correct the Perceived
Injustice dth a Subsequent Amendment of the Rules
Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia,'"' reviewing the appointment of a guardian
ad litem, stated the generally recognized rule for determining the meaning
of a rule:
When construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules of
construction that govern the interpretation of statutes. We first look to the
plain language of the rule and construe it according to its plain or literal
meaning. In doing so we keep in mind that the rules of civil procedure are
given a liberal construction so as "to obtain a just, fair, equitable and
impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of
substantive law."1 57
To illustrate such a "pure," "plain meaning" (or some would say
formalistic) interpretation of rules, one need only look to the 1969 case,
(Providing the circumstances under which an appellate court is required to render a judgment).
154. See id. at 929 (noting the split between courts of appeal as to the proper disposition of a
case when there is insufficient evidence to support a post-answer default judgment).
155. See TEX. R. App. P. 43.3(b) (describing the circumstances under which a court of appeals
must remand a case).
156. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2012).
157. Id. at 579 (citations omitted) (first citing In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleber, 222 S.W.3d
434, 437 (Tex. 2007); then citing In rr E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2009); and then quoting TEX. R.
Civ. P. 1).
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Akers v. Simpson.'5 8 Akers, a limousine driver, was in a collision with a car
driven by Simpson.1 5 9 Simpson sued Akers and Hayden, the employer of
Akers.16 0  The constable served Hayden, left the process for Akers with
Hayden but indicated on the return that Akers was personally served.1 "'
Hayden's insurance company answered for both Hayden and Akers.16 2 In
his later personal injury suit, Akers denied that he knew an answer had
been filed on his behalf.'6 1 In the original action, the insurance company
negotiated a settlement with Simpson, which was finalized with an agreed
judgment against the defendants for the amount of the settlement.'6 4
While this was going on, Akers filed his own personal injury suit against
Simpson. Simpson then moved for summary judgment in the trial court,
in the action by Aker against Simpson, on the basis that Akers's claim was
a compulsory counterclaim in the trial court for the Simpson v.
Hayden/Akers'6 ' action, the first suit.' 6 6 The trial court entered summary
judgment for Simpson in Akers's suit against him;'6 7 the Houston Court
of Appeals affirmed;'6 8  and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed.' 6 1 In
these proceedings, Akers tried to show that he, personally, had no notice
and took no action in the first suit.' 7 0 All his efforts were rejected.
Akers's suit against Simpson was labeled a collateral attack upon the
judgment issued in the original Simpson v. Akers action that had been
settled by the entry of an agreed judgment:
A collateral attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid its binding force in a
158. Akers 11, 445 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1969); see also Robert M. Roller, Note, Texas Pcedure: A
Party Cannot Collateraly Attack a judgment Recital that He War Served wath Citation in Order to Avoid the
Compulsog Counterclaim Effects of a PriorJudgment, 48 TEx. L. REv. 978, 978 (1970) (analyzing the Akers
v. Simpson case).
159. Akers II, 445 S.W.2d at 958. On October 23, Simpson filed a personal injury suit in the
District Court of Harris County, Texas against Hayden and Akers, and on November 20, an answer
in the form of a general denial was filed in their names. On December 8, Akers filed a personal
injury suit against Simpson in the District Court of Harris County, and on January 23, 1968, Simpson
filed an answer to the merits.
160. Id. at 958.
161. Id. at 959.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 958.
165. Akers v. Simpson (Akers 1), 437 S.W.2d 429 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), affd,
445 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1969).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 430
168. Id. at 432.
169. Akers 11, 445 S.W.2d at 958.
170. Id.
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proceeding not instituted for such purpose .... Akers chose not to institute
a direct attack on the Simpson judgment by means of which he could have
avoided the compulsory counterclaim effect of the judgment in the suit of
Akers against Simpson. Not having done so, the jurisdictional recitals of the
judgment in the Simpson suit bring Akers under the decisions which hold
that Rule 97(a) bars a subsequent suit growing out of the same accident
when a prior suit between the same parties is concluded by a judgment
pursuant to a compromise settlement agreement.1 7 1
As a result of the decision, Akers was left with no remedy for his alleged
personal injuries. This could be perceived as an unfair and technical
decision.1 72  Within a year, the court recognized the problem1
7
1
demonstrated by the Akers decision and effectively overruled it by
amending Rule 97(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to add the
following provision:
[P]rovided, however, that a judgment based upon a settlement or
compromise of a claim of one party to the transaction or occurrence prior to
a disposition on the merits shall not operate as a bar to the continuation or
assertion of the claims of any other party to the transaction or occurrence
unless the latter has consented in writing that said judgment shall operate as
a bar.17 4
While Akers lost, those who followed did not lose. The rule was
changed in an orderly fashion. Akers was a hard case with a harsh
individual result, but an easy case in light of the goal of maintaining a
predictable, functioning procedural system.
There are many such examples of simple application of various rules of
procedure with, what could be called, a resulting injustice. One such
example of this is In re Brookshire Grocey Co.,'s where the court dealt with,
what the dissent called, a "tricky" procedural rule. The result was that it
was too late for Brookshire to perfect an appeal. The majority noted,
while the trial court's plenary power is usually extended by filing a motion
for new trial within thirty days of the signing of the judgment, plenary
power was not extended by filing a motion for new trial within thirty days
171. Id. at 959.
172. For a criticism of the Akers v. Simpson decision, demonstrating the perceived unfairness of
the opinion, see generally Roller, supra note 158, at 978-84.
173. Chandler v. Cashway Bldg. Materials, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ).
174. TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a).
175. In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
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but after a prior motion for new trial had been overruled.'7 6
The Akers manner of dealing with the dilemma of rule interpretation
(application of the plain meaning of the rule) avoids all of the pitfalls of
interpretation put forth by Fuller, as modified for the purposes of this
proposal:
(1) there was no lacuna, no lack of rules or law, and the result was not
ad hoc or inconsistent adjudication;
(2) there was no failure to publicize the rule of law being applied;
(3) there was no unclear or obscure legislation;
(4) there was no retroactive legislation-to the contrary, the rule was
applied as written and was subsequently changed in an orderly
manner;
(5) there were no contradictions in the law;
(6) there were no demands beyond the power of parties to Texas
litigation;
(7) the rule remained stable, and there was no revision of the rule; and
(8) there was no divergence between the administration of the rule,
and the declared rule, nor was any party adversely impacted by the
court's action.17 7
Dealing with Mistakes that Tould Deprive the Court ofJurisdiction
The next two examples involve issues of jurisdiction, which implicates
both procedure and judicial power. Rule interpretation becomes more
difficult if the error is one of omission that is essential to jurisdiction and
relates to perfection of a procedural right, such as perfection of appeal.
Then it should be a matter of whether the error is due to an outside event
or circumstance, or whether it is due to the mistake of the party.
176. Part of the decision turned on the distinction between the words or and and. Id. at 69
(citing Bd. of Ins. Comm'rs of Tex. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 180 S.W.2d 906, 908 (rex.
1944)); see also Robinson v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 569 S.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Tex. 1978) ("While there
may be circumstances which call for such a construction, ordinarily the words 'and' and 'or' are not
interchangeable."); Bayou Pipeline Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 568 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. 1978)
(emphasizing or and and are not interchangeable); Ron Beal, The Art of Statutog Construction: Texas
Syle, 64 BAYLOR L. REv. 339, 382 (2012) ("The question may arise as to whether the legislature
intended the meaning of a word as it was understood at the time of its enactment or its meaning at
the time of litigation.").
177. See FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, sapra note 73, at 33-38 (outlining the eight issues the law
should avoid for moral reasons-adopted here, not for moral reasons but to establish an orderly way
of interpreting rules of procedure, even in hard cases).
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B. Ignore the Rule to Avoid an Injustice Brought on by External Events
1. Example: Courthouse Closed
One alternative to a rule that leads to an injustice is to ignore the literal
wording of a rule. This seems to be appropriate when justice requires it
because of external events and no harm will come to the procedural
system or the opposing party. One rare example is Burkitt v. Glenney,17 8
where the court was faced with a filing problem. The court of appeals
issued its opinion for Burkitt on October 3, 1963.' A motion for
rehearing was denied on October 24, 1963.180 At that time, the
application for writ of error was due thirty days thereafter, on Monday,
November 25, 1963. On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy
was assassinated. A presidential proclamation was issued the next day,
announcing a national day of mourning on Monday, November 25,
1963.1"8 It was also announced on November 22 that the Harris County
Courthouse would be closed on Monday, November 25.182 Because the
178. Burkitt v. Glenney, 371 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1963, writ refd
n.r.e.).
179. Id. at 412.
180. Id.
181. Proclamation 3561: National Day of Mourning for President Kennedy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 2
(Nov. 23, 1963). As one commentator notes,
It is hard to grasp how deeply the nation was affected by the tragedy. Consider this partial list:
From Friday afternoon to Monday evening, TV networks aired nothing but Kennedy-related
coverage, no advertisements, no other programming. Religious services were held Friday,
Saturday, Sunday and Monday, the day of the funeral. Pope Paul VI said a special mass for
Kennedy. Wall Street trading was halted early Friday to avert a panic. The United Nations
adjourned all sessions. The Canadian Parliament adjourned; bells rang in Berlin; condolence
messages poured in from leaders around the world. Chicago and New York theaters canceled
Friday night performances, as did the Lyric Opera of Chicago. The entire Big Ten's Saturday
football schedule was called off, though plenty of other college games were played. NFL games
were played Sunday, but AFL games were postponed. Public and Catholic schools in the
Chicago area closed Monday, the national day of mourning. Most universities also shut down.
Most stores, restaurants, businesses and museums closed all day Monday or during the funeral.
The Midwest Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade were closed. A U.S. rocket
launch was postponed. Las Vegas casinos closed that Monday for just the third time in history.
And finally, this: Telephone operators across the nation stopped accepting calls for a minute of
silence at 11 a.m. Monday.
Stephen Benzkofer, The JFK Assassination: 50 Years Later, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-10/site/ct-per-flash-fk-1110-201311101jfk-
assassination-chicago-board-50-years.
182. See Aff. of Rola Hamm Concerning the Harris County Courthouse Closure as It Pertains
to Burkit v. Glenney (Feb. 20, 1964) [hereinafter Aff. of Hamm] (swearing it was announced "that he
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courthouse was closed on the due date, the petitioner's attorney was
unable to file the application for writ of error until Tuesday, November 26,
one day late.' The Supreme Court of Texas denied the application for
writ of error-writ refused, w.o.j. (want of jurisdiction), and the petitioner
filed a motion for rehearing, accompanied by affidavits explaining the
delay.'8 4
Before this case arrived in the Texas Supreme Court, it had been
mentioned in Smith v. Harmis County-Houston Shio Channel Naigation
District8  as dicta that "only the days designated in Article 4591186 are
legal holidays within the meaning of Rule 4.""' Thus, while the Harris
County courthouse was closed, under that authority, Monday,
November 25, was not a legal holiday.
The petitioner's attorney, C.O. Ryan, filed an affidavit averring that the
application was ready for filing by mid-morning on Monday,
November 25, that he attempted to contact the clerk's office by telephone
but learned it was closed, and that the application was filed the following
Tuesday morning, at approximately 8:30 a.m.' The clerk of the court of
Harris County Courthouse . .. w[as] to be closed on Monday, November 25[, 19631").
183. Aff. of C.O. Ryan Concerning the Status of Filing Petitioner's Application for Writ of
Error in Burkitt v. Glenney (Feb. 20, 1964) [hereinafter Aff. of Ryan] (swearing the writ of error was
filed "at approximately 8:30 A.M. on Tuesday, November 26, 1963, as soon as the Clerk's office was
open for business").
184. Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing, Burkitt, 371 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (No. A-9873) (on file with the St. May's Law Journal [hereinafter
Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing]; Aff. of Hamm; Aff. of Ryan.
185. Smith v. Harris Cty.-Hous. Ship Channel Nay. Dist., 329 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1959).
186. See Act ofJune 11, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 445, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1616, 1616,
repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 46(1), 1993 Tex. Gen Laws 583, 718 (listing
official state holidays).
187. Smith, 329 S.W.2d at 847. The Smith case was followed in Dorchester Master Lid. Partnershtp
v. Hunt, 790 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam), Johnson v. Texas Employers Insurance Assocation,
674 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam), and Mid-Continent Regerator Co. v. Tackett, 584 S.W.2d
705, 706 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam). Two courts of appeal have relied upon the Blackman's. Suarez v.
Brown, 414 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ refd), overruled per curiam by
Miller Brewing Co. v. Villarreal, 829 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1992); AAAction Plumbing Co. v. Stewart,
792 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The language of Smith
"restricting legal holidays to only two categories, and excluding holidays designated by commissioners
courts, was not essential to the disposition of the case and was therefore dicta." Miller Brewing Co.
v. Villarreal, 829 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam). Note that by rule amendment, some
changes have occurred. See Hunt, 790 S.W.2d at 552-53 (holding, as a result of rule amendments,
"the day after Christmas is a legal holiday within the meaning of [Tex. R. App. P.] 5(a) when
Christmas falls on a Sunday," and that the rule "did not limit legal holidays ... to those specified in
[A]rticle 4591" (citations omitted)).
188. Aff. of Ryan., at 1-2.
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appeals, swore that on Saturday, upon learning of the Presidential
Proclamation and the closing of the courthouse on Monday, she consulted
with Chief Justice Bell and, "at his direction and with his approval,
determined that the [c]lerk's office should remain closed on Monday,
November 25."' "
As stated, on original submission, the court denied the application for
writ of error, w.o.j.,' 90 indicating they did not have jurisdiction of the case.
On rehearing, the court denied the application writ ref., n.r.e., effectively
ignoring their prior interpretation of the statute and finding no error, and
after accepting jurisdiction, left the lower court actions unchanged. The
results on original submission and on rehearing were, for practical
purposes, the same: the prior actions of lower courts were left unchanged.
However, on rehearing, there was a perception that justice had been done.
This action seems to be both proper and just.
At that time, there was no provision for the extension of an appellate
timetable, hence, Rule 1-the secondary rule-could come into play.
With this Burkitt approach, most of Fuller's objections to ad hoc change
were met.
2. Example: Inmate's Mail Was Late Because of Prison Authorities
A situation similar to Burkilt occurred with regard to inmates, who have
no control of their mail. In Houser v. McElveen,"' another truly hard case,
an inmate deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mail service thirty-
five days after the trial court's judgment of dismissal.'9 2 It was not
received by the court of appeals until the forty-sixth day.19 3 The court of
appeals dismissed the appeal." The Texas Supreme Court found this to
be in error:
The notice of appeal was required to be filed within [thirty] days of the
judgment, but the court of appeals should have extended that time if, within
the next [fifteen] days, Houser filed his notice of appeal and a motion for
189. Aff. of Hamm., at 1-2.
190. From February 1, 1946 until December 31, 1987, the designation "writ dismissed, w.o..
(want of jurisdiction)" meant the Texas Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the case or that
the application of writ of error failed to properly present the error.
191. Houser v. McElveen (HouserIl), 243 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 646.
193. Id.
194. Houser v. McElveen (Houser 1), No. 13-05-00426-CV, 2006 WL 328134, at *1 (Tex.




extension with a reasonable explanation. The notice of appeal was deemed
filed on the day he mailed it, since it was received one day after the [fifteen]-
day deadline. 1 9 5
In short, the appealing party had done everything within his power to
satisfy the time requirements of the rules and, thus, was not penalized for
the late filing error or tardiness of prison officials." Again, this action
seems to be both proper and just.
In these cases, the appealing party did everything within his or her
power to comply with the primary rule. Without fault, the party did all
required by the rules but was prevented from doing so by external forces.
Application of the secondary rule, Rule 1, was authorized since there was a
circumstance not anticipated by the primary rule and there was no fault on
the part of the party in question.
In these circumstances, the primary rule is explicit and directly
applicable but applying the secondary rule was proper:
(1) While these cases involved an ad hoc adjudication, each presented
a situation where application of the secondary rule, Rule 1, was
appropriate since the application of that rule impacted only the one
case before the Court and for external reasons.
(2) These were ad hoc decisions. The primary rule remained the
same, and the application of the secondary rule was justified by
circumstances beyond the control of the party and not anticipated by
the rules. Individual justice was done and was proper.
(3) There was no unclear or obscure legislation. The primary rule
remained the same. In Burkitt, the actual holding of the court was
published for those familiar with the writ history system, although for
others it was obscure. This action, however, was justified by
circumstances beyond the control of the party and not anticipated by
the rules. Individual justice was done and was proper. In Houser, the
court published an opinion which justified treating the notice as
timely filed. Again, the primary rule was left in place.
(4) There was no retroactive legislation. The primary rule remained
the same, and application of the secondary rule was justified by
circumstances beyond the control of the party and not anticipated by
the rules. Individual justice was done and was proper.
(5) There were no contradictions in the law. The primary rule
195. Houser II, 234 S.W.3d at 646 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 647; see a/so Williams v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)
(holding an inmate's late filing of a docketing statement was excused because it had been timely
mailed but mislaid by the clerk).
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remained the same, and application of the secondary rule was
publicized and justified for all to see. Application of the secondary
rule was justified by circumstances beyond the control of the party
and not anticipated by the rules. Individual justice was done and was
proper.
(6) No demand was made that was beyond the power of the subjects
and the ruled. No party was harmed by these ad hoc decisions.
(7) There was no unstable legislation. The primary rule remained the
same, and application of the secondary rule was publicized for those
understanding the writ history system and was justified by
circumstances beyond the control of the party and not anticipated by
the rules. Individual justice was done and was proper.
(8) While there was a divergence as to the primary rule, the
application of the secondary rule was justified by the circumstances
beyond the control of the party and not anticipated by the rules.
Individual justice was done and was proper.'9 7
C. Ignore the Rule to Avoid a Perceived Injustice Even Though the Mistake Is
Attributable to the Par)' 98
Unlike the two cases just discussed, Verburgt v. Dorner99 was not a hard
case. Not only was the rule in question clear but also the failure to follow
the mandate of the rule should have deprived the court of jurisdiction to
act.
Under the prior procedures related to the transfer of jurisdiction from
the trial court to the appellate court, evolving200 from convoluted20 ' to
197. See FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73, at 33-38 (detailing the eight principles that
govern the moral purposes of the law).
198. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3 ("A court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or
dismiss an appeal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without allowing a
reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregularities.").
199. Verburgt II, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997).
200. Nathan L. Hecht & E. Lee Parsley, Procedural Reform: Whence and Whither, in
MATTHEW BENDER C.L.E., PRACTICING LAW UNDER THE NEW RULES OF TRIAL AND
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1-12 (1997).
201. The court illustrated the difficulties of the former procedure in El Paso & N.E.R Co. v.
Wbatle
Appeals from district courts to the Courts of Civil Appeals are regulated by the following
article of the Revised Statutes of 1895: "Art. 1387. An appeal may, in cases where an appeal is
allowed, be taken during the term of the court at which the final judgment in the cause is
rendered, by the appellants giving notice of appeal in open court within two days after final
judgment, or two days after judgment overruling a motion for a new trial, which shall be noted
on the docket and entered of record, and by his filing with the clerk an appeal bond, where
bond is required by law, or affidavit in lieu thereof, as hereinafter provided, within twenty days
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more simplified2 02 procedures, the failure to timely file a notice of appeal,
cost bond, or affidavit in lieu thereof has always been jurisdictional.2 0 3
While the requirement for the transfer of jurisdictional power remained, in
1997, the rules related to the procedural device for transferring power were
amended to simplify the procedure:
On March 20, 1997, the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals signed orders adopting the new Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure.20 4
One of the most drastic changes in Texas appellate procedure is
embodied in new Rule 25, which requires the timely filing of a "notice of
appeal" to perfect an appeal in all civil cases. Under former practice, except
in those cases in which no bond was required by law, a properly and timely
filed appeal bond (or substitute) was a mandatory prerequisite to invoke the
appellate court's jurisdiction in civil cases. The purpose of the highly
technical appeal bond procedure was to provide security for the court
reporter, court clerk, and the prevailing party in the trial court, for the costs
of the appeal. The requirement of an appeal bond or cost deposit in lieu of
a bond is entirely eliminated by new Rule 25.205
Thus, the notice of appeal became the procedural device by which
after the expiration of the term. If the term of the court may by law continue more than eight
weeks, the oond, or affidavit in lieu thereof, shall be filed within twenty days after notice of
appeal is given, if the party taking the appeal resides in the county, and within thirty days if he
resides out of the county."
El Paso & N.E.R. Co. v. Whatley, 87 S.W. 819, 820 (Tex. 1905).
202. As stated in White v. Schiweiz,
The perfection of an appeal is a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of an appellate court.
There are four ways to perfect a civil appeal: (1) by timely filing an appeal bond; (2) by timely
depositing cash; (3) by timely filing an affidavit of inability to pay costs on appeal or give
security therefor (if the affidavit is contested, when the contest is overruled); (4) by timely filing
written notice of appeal if a statutory exemption for costs applies. An affidavit in lieu of bond
must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed, or, if a timely motion for new trial
has been filed, within ninety days after the judgment is signed.
White v. Schiwetz, 793 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (citations
omitted).
203. See Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding) ("Filing a cost
bond ... is a necessary and jurisdictional step in perfecting an appeal."); Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 291 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1956) ("It is well settled ... that the requirement that the bond
be filed within thirty days is mandatory and jurisdictional.").
204. John Hill Cayce, Jr. et al., Civil Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules ofAppellate
Procedure, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 867, 872 (1997) (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 877 (footnotes omitted).
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jurisdiction is kept alive and transferred from the trial court to the
appellate court.206
Under Rule 26.1,207 a party seeking to appeal a case must file a notice
of appeal within thirty days of the signing of a judgment if there is no
post-judgment motion or within ninety days if there is a post-judgment
motion.208 Rule 26.3 allows for an extension of time, up to fifteen days, if
the appealing party files the notice of appeal and "files a motion in the
appellate court complying with Rule 10.5(b)." 209 The notice of appeal and
extension must be filed within the period for the notice of appeal and the
fifteen days allowed for an extension.210  If either the late notice of appeal
or the motion seeking to extend time by stating an excuse for the late filing
was filed late, the appeal, before Verburgh, had to be dismissed.2 11
Rule 10.5(b) requires any such motion state "the facts relied on to
reasonably explain the need for an extension."2 12
206. See In re J.M., 396 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) ("Filing a notice of appeal
invokes the court of appeal's jurisdiction over the parties to the trial court's judgment or order."
(quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b))).
207. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1.
208. See Jim Claunch, When Is a judgment Final?, 62 TEX. B.J. 536, 538 (1999) (outlining the
timeline for filing an extension of time).
209. TEx. R. App. P. 26.3.
210. Id. R. 26.3; see also VerburgtII, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (Enoch, J., dissenting)
(stating the court has held, "to extend the time in which to file the notice of appeal, one must file not
only the notice of appeal, but in addition 'a motion' that 'must state: ... [among other things] the
facts relied on to reasonably explain the need for an extension'.
211. "A limitation on the ability of the appellate court to extend the time to file a notice of
appeal is that the notice of appeal and the motion to extend time must be filed with the trial court
within fifteen days of the original deadline." MCDONALD & CARISON, supra note 117, § 13:8; see
Brown Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Mountbatten Sur. Co., 377 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (providing an extension of time to file the notice of appeal may be granted if
an appellant properly files a motion to extend time within fifteen days after the deadline to file the
notice); see also B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982) (holding a
motion for extension of time must be filed within fifteen days of the last day for filing as prescribed
by Rule 21c); Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 800-01 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding) (providing a
cost bond was timely filed and an appeal properly perfected when it was received not more than ten
days late); City of Lancaster v. Tex. Nat'l Res. Conservation Comm'n, 935 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.
App.-Austin, 1996, writ denied) (per curiam) (providing "appellant must move for extension of
time to perfect appeal within fifteen days after perfecting instrument is due"); Fite v. Johnson,
654 S.W.2d 51, 52 (rex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (stating a party may obtain an extension of time
to file a bond from an appellate court if the bond is "filed in the trial court within fifteen days after
the last day for filing the bond and a motion to extend the time is filed in the appellate court within
the same period"); Flores v. Citizens State Bank of Roma, 954 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. App.-Austin
1997, no writ) (per curiam) (indicating a motion for extension of time must be filed within fifteen day
grace period).
212. TEx. R. APP. P. 10.5(b).
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In Verbugt v. Dorner, the appealing party filed the notice of appeal late
but did not file a 10.5(b) motion.2 13 The San Antonio Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal, holding
in the absence of a timely filed cost bond, this court lacks jurisdiction to act
unless the appellant filed a motion for extension of time within the fifteen
day grace period. Because the motion for extension of time was not timely
filed-indeed, it was not filed at all-this court is without jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the appeal.2 14
The majority reasoned, "Finality is achieved by the setting of arbitrary
deadlines in the rules. And sometimes, as shown in this case, the effect of
strict application of the appellate deadlines is unavoidably harsh."2 15
Justice Duncan dissented from the dismissal, arguing the dismissal was
not "absolutely necessary" under the facts of the case-where the
appellant timely filed a document (the notice of appeal) in a bona fide
effort to appeal.2 1 6 The Supreme Court of Texas, following the dissenting
opinion of Judge Duncan," held that a motion for extension of time is
necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files the notice
of appeal, brief, or other appellate document late but, within the motion,
explains the need for the extension. Thus, the fifteen-day period in which
the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline under
Rule 26.3 has been extended even further if one of the two-rule required
steps is taken. In short, the court altered the rule by decision. Justice
Enoch, joined by Justices Abbott and Hankinson dissented:
From today forward, one need no longer timely appeal to invoke an
appellate court's jurisdiction. But just two months ago, this Court retained
the longstanding rule that only a timely filed appeal invokes appellate
jurisdiction. We insisted that to perfect appeal in a civil case, the notice of
appeal must be filed within the time prescribed in the rules. Further, we
insisted that to extend the time in which to file the notice of appeal, one
must file not only the notice of appeal, but in addition "a motion" that "must
213. Verburgt II, 959 S.W.2d at 615.
214. Verburgt v. Dorner (Verburgt 1, 928 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996),
rev'd and remanded, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997).
215. Id. at 656.
216. Id at 657 (Duncan,J., dissenting) ("[jhe issue is not whether the rules condone a patently
unfair result but whether they require it.").
217. Id. at 657-59. It may be significant to note thatJustice Duncan was the appellate lawyer in
City ofSan Antonio v. Rodriguest where the Texas Supreme Court properly determined that the use of
an incorrect cause number in a notice of appeal did not preclude the consideration of an appeal. City
of San Antonio v. Rodriguez 828 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
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state: ... [among other things] the facts relied on to reasonably explain the
need for an extension." Like our new rules, the plain language of the rule
that applies to this case, Rule 41(a) (2), mandates that the appeal be timely;
consequently, it compels the result the court of appeals reached in this case.
Is this a bad result? For the hopeful appellant, perhaps (assuming that the
appeal is, in fact, meritorious). But denuding the Court's rules to achieve the
Court's chosen result is bad law. I dissent.21 8
Justice Baker filed a separate dissenting opinion, making two points:
The court of appeals reached the decision required by applying the plain
and unambiguous language of Rule 41 (a)(2).
The Court's opinion dispenses with Rule 41(a) (2)'s requirements, and
amends the rule by judicial fiat. The Court's opinion is contrary to its own
precedent. I would deny the writ. Because the Court decides otherwise, I
dissent.2 19
The result has (at the time of this publication) produced well to over
1,500 cites (including 1,154 cases) dealing with this judicial amendment-
without-amending. In cases, such as Industrial Seices U.S.A., Inc. P.
Ameican Bank, N.A.,2 2 0 it has been determined that this judicially created
implication does not remove the requirement that the movant provide a
reasonable explanation2 2 1 as to why an extension is necessary. Thus, it is
still necessary to demonstrate facts that reasonably show a need to extend
the time for filing the notice of appeal.2
218. Verburgt II, 959 S.W.2d at 617 (Enoch, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting TEX. R.
APP. P. 26).
219. Id. at 619 (Baker, J., dissenting) (citing TEx. R. APP. P. 41(a)(1) (footnote omitted)).
220. Indus. Servs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Am. Bank, N.A., 17 S.W.3d. 358 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2000, no pet) (per curiam).
221. The allegation of a reasonable explanation is not difficult. For example, in National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. Ninth Court ofAppeals, the court held, "While a court of appeals may not grant a
motion that lacks a reasonable explanation, the mere presence of a reasonable explanation does not
require that the court of appeals grant the motion. Nothing in the remainder of Rule 54(c) divests
the court of appeals of the discretion granted it by the word 'may' in the first line." Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 864 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. 1993). One seeking an extension of
time to file a statement of facts on appeal is required to reasonably explain the need for an extension
of time for the late filing of the statement of facts. Id. (quoting TEx. R. APP. P. 54(c)). The phrase
"reasonably explaining" means "any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to
file within the required period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence,
mistake[,] or mischance." Id. at 60. Here, counsel's confusion over the time in which to file an
electronic record constituted a reasonable explanation.
222. This holding has been extended into other areas of the procedural timetable. See Bennett
v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (holding the "spirit of [the] appellate rules" was
fully served despite a party's late filing of a statement of issues because the delay did not prejudice the
other side); see also Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., 864 S.W.2d at 64 (holding a writ of mandamus will issue
617
ST. MARY'S LA WJouRNAL
It may seem technical to say the two requirements of Rule 26.1 are both
jurisdictionally necessary. However, that is the way the rule is written, and
it is the way it had been interpreted until the Verburst decision. Verburg/'s
modification of the rule by published opinion, without later rule changes,
fails under the modified Fuller analysis:
(1) Not only was there no lack of rules, there was, and there is, a
published rule of procedural law, which remains unchanged. The
published holding of Verburgt alters the rule without changing the
published rule. This was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and may
alter the position of the parties to this or future cases. The action
was, and will be in future actions, due to the failure of a party to
follow the published primary rule. No general set of circumstances
existed that prevented the party from complying with the primary
rule.
(2) There was no failure to publicize the judicial opinion modifying
the rule, but the Rule itself remained unchanged, and in that sense,
there was a failure to publicize or make known the rule of law.
(3) The opinion was not unclear, but it was inconsistent with the
published rule and, thus, was obscure legislation that could be missed.
(4) This was retroactive legislation.
(5) The opinion did create a contradiction in the law.
(6) The opinion did not announce demands that were beyond the
power of the subjects and the ruled, but it did place a heavy burden
upon the intermediate appellate courts to deal with the unmodified
modified rule.
(7) This opinion did represent destabilization of the Rule and the
procedure for rule change.
(8) There was a divergence between adjudication/administration and
legislation.223
because the court of appeals based its decision on an erroneous legal standard for judging the
reasonableness of the movant's explanation). However, it would not necessarily have been an abuse
of discretion to deny the extension of time; Rule 54(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
specifically makes such a decision discretionary. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co., 864 S.W.2d at 59. While a
court of appeals may not grant a motion that lacks a reasonable explanation, the mere presence of a
reasonable explanation does not require that the court of appeals grant the motion. Nothing in the
remainder of Rule 54(c) divests the court of appeals of the discretion granted it by the word "may" in
the first line. Id
223. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73, at 33-38 (detailing the eight principles that
govern the moral purposes of the law). The Texas Supreme Court also diverged from the holding of
the other high court in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which holds directly contrary to
Verbuigt. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("When a notice of appeal
is filed within the fifteen-day period but no timely motion for extension of time is filed, the appellate
court lacks jurisdiction.").
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D. Rensite by Interpretaion Without Rewriting the Rule: Preserving Error to the
Jury Charge
The Texas rules concerning preservation of error in a jury charge have
always been complicated but not difficult if one followed the language of
the rules. This was certainly true before broad-form submission of issues;
as explained by Professor Dorsaneo,
Before September 1, 1973, the objection/request practice had a type of
disciplined logic to it because under prior law the role of questions and
instructions in Texas charge practice was fairly rigidly defined. There were
only a few matters that could be incorporated into the charge in question
form or as definitions and instructions accompanying the questions.2 2 4
The most systematic, or basic, explanation of the rules was provided by
Judge Frank Wilson of the Tenth Court of Appeals (Waco) in Lyles v. Texas
Employers Insurance Ass'n.2 1 Judge Wilson also taught a practice course for
students at Baylor School of Law. It is thought that this opinion may have
been drafted as a simple guide for those students to insert into the trial
notebook he required each student to prepare.2 2 6
Jury charges are finalized and prepared after the parties have rested and
before the case is presented to the jury.2 27  "All objections not so
presented shall be considered as waived."2 2 1 Objections are preserved
either by a request or objection, depending on whether the defect or
omission is in a submitted issue, instruction, or definition and depending
on which party carries the burden on the issue .2 2  The traditional
distinctions are generally explained in Lyles
[A] request for submission is the method of preserving the right to complain
of omission of, or failure to submit an issue which is relied on by the
complaining party.2 30  Objection, however, is the proper method of
224. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reaision and Recodlfcaion of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Concerning the uy Charge, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 675, 692 (2000).
225. Lyles v. Tex. Emp'rs Ins. Ass'n, 405 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ
refd, n.r.e.) (holding an appellant did not preserve error in a jury charge by only requesting
alternative language and not objecting to the charge).
226. Dorsaneo, supra note 224, at 680.
227. TEx. R. CIv. P. 272.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. This interpretation of the rules (and the Lyles approach) has been criticized. Dorsaneo,
supra note 224, at 684-85. But Moris v. Holt eliminated the requirement by decision. See Morris v.
Holt, 714 S.W.2d 311, 312-13 (Tex. 1986) (holding either a request or an objection may be used to
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preserving complaint as to (1) an issue actually submitted, but claimed to be
defective; or (2) failure to submit, where the ground of recovery or defense
is relied on by the opposing party.2 31
As stated by Professor Dorsaneo,2 3 2  while the rigid form of
"objections" and "requests" required to preserve error to a jury charge in
Texas was easier to understand before submission was adopted in 1973-
and, even then, before it became a reality following Burk Royaly Co. v.
Wall 3 3-the rules to command "objections" and "requests" continues to
control preservation of error to a jury charge.23 Despite the clear
commandments of the rules involved, the Supreme Court of Texas has
relaxed their application in two major decisions. First, in Morris v. Holt,23
the court held a requested issue or an objection to the omission will
preserve error to the trial court's failure to submit an issue essential to the
opponent's case.2 3  Then, in State Department of Highways & Public
Transportation v. Payne, the court issued the following broad statement:
There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error
in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of
the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling. The more specific
requirements of the rules should be applied, while they remain, to serve
rather than defeat this principle.2 3 7
Thus, when a party fails to submit a theory to the jury, the trial court
cannot deem it found unless some element of the theory was submitted
and, then, only if there is no objection to the failure to submit the entire
preserve error to the trial court's failure to submit an issue essential to the opponent's case).
231. Lyles v. Tex. Emp'rs Ins. Ass'n, 405 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ
ref'd, n.r.e.) (footnote added); see Religious of the Sacred Heart v. City of Houston, 836 S.W.2d 606,
614 (Tex. 1992) (discussing a defendant's failure to offer necessary evidence regarding the market
value measure of compensation); see also Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665-66 (Tex. 1989)
(indicating an instance where, although issues were defectively submitted, the opposing party fails to
object by "distinctly pointing out any error"); Wilgus v. Bond, 730 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. 1987)
(providing a party waives any error in a submission by failing to properly object); Davis v. Campbell,
572 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. 1978) (stating "[wlhere a litigant fails to distinctly object upon a certain
ground, complaint on that ground is waived on appeal").
232. Dorsaneo, supra note 224, at 692.
233. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911(rex. 1981).
234. Id. at 925.
235. Morris v. Holt, 714 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1986).
236. See id. at 312 ("Rule 279 permits a party in Morris' position to preserve error as to the trial
court's failure to submit an issue by making a timely, specific objection or by requesting submission
of the issue in substantially correct form.").
237. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992).
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theory in a proper manner. Where this occurs, the proper action for
the appellate court is to render judgment.239
As one commentator observed, "In 1992 the Texas Supreme Court
determined in [Payne] that a defendant preserved charge error when
precedent and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure held otherwise."240
In short, the Texas Supreme Court, in these two opinions, has indicated
that it will, or will not, know error when it sees it and not in the manner
commanded by the rules. In both Moris and Payne, the court violated the
Fuller proposal (as modified for use in this Article):
(1) While there was no lack of rules or law, the Morris and Payne
decisions called for ad hoc and inconsistent adjudication contrary to
the published rules of procedure.241
(2) There was no failure to publicize or make known the rules of law,
but there was an indication that future cases would be decided on an
ad hoc basis.24 2  This alters the position of parties in these, and
future, cases.
(3) There was no unclear or obscure legislation that was impossible to
understand, but in these opinions there was a call for ad hoc decision-
making that has no predictability; thus, it destabilized the published
rules.2 4 3
(4) Moris and Payne both amounted to retroactive legislation.244
(5) Morris and Payne contradicted the published law.24
(6) The demands of Morris and Payne were not beyond the power of
238. See Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 411 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1994, writ denied) (discussing the implication of Rule 279 and deemed findings where neither
party objects to a clear omitted element in a charge to the jury).
239. Gibson v. State, No. 01-96-01312-CR, 1999 WL 233411, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Apr. 22, 1999, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
240. David F. Johnson, Presening Er-or in the Charge, 29 ADVOC. (TEX.) 42, 42 (2004).
241. See id. ("Without expressly amending the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas
Supreme Court ambiguously loosened the charge preservation of error rules in the case of State
Department offHighways & Pubc Transportation v. Payne.").
242. See William G. "Bud" Arnot, III & David Fowler Johnson, Current Trends in Texas Charge
Practice: Preservation of Error and Broad-Form Use, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 371, 413 (2007) (discussing
repercussions of Payne on charge preservation of error including an increase in ad hoc basis).
243. See Johnson, supra note 240, at 43 ("Correspondingly, the courts of appeals have been
inconsistent in using the Payne standard versus the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.").
244. See Stephen K. Hayes, Could You Be a little More Speafi, 66 ADVOC. (TEx.) 196, 225 (2014)
(analyzing the court's establishment of the Payne decision as a forerunner to major changes in the
Texas Civil Rules of Procedure).
245. See Johnson, supra note 240, at 43 (discussing the clash between published law and the
mandates of the Payne decision, particularly "[t]he requirement that a request be in substantially
correct wording seems to have been overruled by Payne so long as the request brings the error to the
attention of the trial court").
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the subjects and the ruled but predicting the outcome of cases is
beyond the power of the subjects and ruled.
(7) Morris and Payne amounted to destabilization of established
ruiles.2 46
(8) There was a divergence between adjudication/administration and
legislation.2 4 7
Since the decision in Payne, the Supreme Court of Texas has begun to
recognize the problems presented by the broad sweep of Payne, but it has
not abandoned that approach. As stated in CruZ v. Andrews Restoradon,
Inc.,248
Payne's cure must not worsen the disease. Trial courts lack the time and
the means to scour every word, phrase, and omission in a charge that is
created in the heat of trial in a compressed period of time. A proposed
charge, whether drafted by a party or by the court, may misalign the parties;
misstate the burden of proof; leave out essential elements; omit a defense,
cause of action, or (as here) a line [in the damage issue] for attorney's fees.
Our procedural rules require the lawyers to tell the court about such errors
before the charge is formally submitted to a jury. Failing to do so squanders
judicial resources, decreases the accuracy of trial court judgments[] and
wastes time the judge, jurors, lawyers, and parties have devoted to the
case.249
It may be a time for change, but the current state of the law is
dependent on the court's interpretation of the rules. As Professor
Dorsaneo concludes,
The court's own efforts to remedy deficiencies in the current rules by judicial
decisions are not an adequate substitute for their wholesale revision. It is
now unclear whether: (1) an objection is technically necessary when a charge
request is made, (2) a charge request is required when an objection does not
tell the trial judge how to solve the problem the complaint identifies, and
most importantly (3) how informative an objection must otherwise be to
pass procedural muster. Adoption of the revised jury charge rules as they
appear in the Recodification Draft preferably with a slight modification to
the basic preservation rule to make it crystal clear that all objections must
246. See Arnot & Johnson, supra note 242, at 413 ("[T]he end result of the Texas Supreme
Court's Payne opinion is great confusion and uncertainty in charge preservation of error.").
247. FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, srpra note 73, at 33-38.
248. Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. 2012).
249. Id. at 829-30 (first citing TEX. R. App. P. 272; and then citing In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d
340, 350 (Tex. 2003)).
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provide reasonable guidance, is long overdue.2 50
However, as presently constituted, it is clear the Texas Supreme Court is
still willing to ignore the plain language of the current rules. In Wackenhut
Corp. v. Gudierre 2 1 1 the court dealt with the troublesome problem of
charging a jury on spoliation2 52 and with the requirement that objections
and additions to the charge must be made after the parties rest but before
the charge is read to the jury.2 53  In this personal injury suit, the party
opposing a spoliation instruction preserved error by responding to a
pretrial motion for sanctions2 54 even though it later failed to formally
object to the instruction's inclusion in the jury charge until after it was read
to the jury. As indicated, the jury charge procedural rules state that
objections to the charge "shall in every instance be presented to the
court... before the charge is read to the jury" and that "[a]ll objections
not so presented shall be considered as waived."2 5 5 Further, the objecting
party "must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds
of the objection."2 56
In Gudierre the following conversation took place during the hearing on
Wackenhut's motion for new trial:
[COUNSEL FOR WACKENHUT]: [TWhe court made a ruling that the
instruction would go to the jury, and then the court took argument on that,
and that's how we ended up with this particular instruction, but it was given
over objection.
THE COURT: [Y]ou are correct. The court heard argument, made its
ruling on the instruction.
[COUNSEL FOR WACKENHUT]: For the record, Your Honor, I think
it is clear that Wackenhut did object to any spoliation instruction going to
250. Dorsaneo, supra note 224, at 716.
251. Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
252. See Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 2014) ("[Sjpoliation jury
instruction, can shift the focus of the case from the merits of the lawsuit to the improper conduct
that was allegedly committed by one of the parties during the course of the litigation process. The
problem is magnified when evidence regarding the spoliating conduct is presented to a jury."); see also
Xavier Rodriguez, Bmoksbire Bror. Cleanup on Aisle 9, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J 447, 455-56 (2015) (referring
to the equation of a spoliation instruction to a "death penalty" sanction).
253. TEx. R. Civ. P. 272.
254. See Guiemer, 453 S.W.3d at 920 (showcasing the court's refusal to acknowledge a party's
objection to a spoliation charge during pretrial but, nonetheless, preserving the error for appeal).
255. TEx. R. Civ. P. 272.
256. Id. R 274.
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the jury at all, . . . and so there is no waiver here. There was an objection to
any instruction going to the jury.
THE COURT: I don't deny that, because I noted that on record that the
objection was made to the charge.2 57
The court found the response to the pretrial motion for sanctions
concerning the spoliation of evidence-in effect a motion in limine, which
does not preserve objections-served to preserve the objection to the jury
charge, citing to Payne:
In light of Wackenhut's specific reasons in its pretrial briefing for
opposing a spoliation instruction and the trial court's recognition that it
submitted the instruction over Wackenhut's objection, there is no doubt that
Wackenhut timely made the trial court aware of its complaint and obtained a
ruling. Under the circumstances presented here, application of Rules 272
and 274 in the manner Gutierrez proposes would defeat their underlying
principle. 2 5 8
So, in the name of simplicity, both Rules 272 and 274 are ignored. In
both Momis and Payne, the court acted improperly. The primary rules are
directly applicable. Creating a judicial exception to a primary rule is not
proper where the primary rule is direct and clear, there are no individual
excuses involved, and a procedure exists to modify the rule. Here, there is
no lacuna; the rules are published and clear (complicated but clear); and
Monis, Payne, and their progeny are forms of retroactive legislation done
on an ad hoc basis. Further, this creates a burden on the parties and the
courts, creates instability, and constitutes a clear divergence between the
published rules and the holdings.
E. Change the Law, Then the Rule, Then the Interpretation of the 'New" Rule-
"Cuning the Law"
In this section, the focus moves from preserving error to the charge to
the writing of the questions/issues, instructions, and definitions in the
charge.25
257. Gutierre, 453 S.W.3d at 920 (alterations in original).
258. Id. at 917-18.
259. Much of this part of the Article comes from my oral and written presentations in a series
of continuing legal educations programs presented in the 1970s and 1980s. Some of these include,
but are not limited to: L. Wayne Scott, ProceduralAspects ofSpeial Issue Submission & Court's Charge, in
3 STATE BAR OFTEx., ADVANCED CiviL TRIAL COURSE (1978); L. Wayne Scott, ProceduralAspects of
Special Issue Submission in Texas, in 2 STATE BAR OF TEX., ADVANCED CiVIL TRIAL COURSE (1979);
L. Wayne Scott, Issue Submission and Court's Cbarge, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL
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Here, again, the matter is controlled by rules. In this example, however,
Rule 277, which relates to the nature of the issue, is general, not specific,
and clearly contemplated some judicial interpretation. This is one of those
circumstances where the Texas Supreme Court was required to flesh out
the rule by interpretation. The problem was that the court moved in one
direction to simple issues; retreated, allowing special or specific issues; and
then curved back to more control over the jury through requirements for
instructions and restricted issues.
In other words, once Rule 277 was "fleshed out," the question turned
into one concerning when the court's action ceased to be an interpretation
of a rule and became a new rule, or rules, without a rule change. This
problem is particularly apparent in a review of the court's struggle with
charging Texas juries in civil cases.
The difficulty of drafting the charge to the jury is one that vexed judges
at common law260 and proved no less troublesome to Texas courts. In an
effort to get away from the problems of the general charge, Texas, in 1913,
entered into an experiment in the use of a special verdict by adopting a
system that allowed deeming unsubmitted issues.2 ' The problem was
defining what constituted an "issue."
In the 1922 case, Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 2 6 2 the Supreme Court of
Texas, interpreting the statutory scheme263 and providing for a special
issue system in Texas, decreed,
The statutes make it the duty of the court in trials by jury: [f]irst, to
submit all the controverted fact issues made by the pleadings[;] second, to
COURT (1979); L. Wayne Scott, Pmcedural Aspects and Pilfalls of Special Issue Submision, in STATE BAR
OF TEX., SPECIAL ISSUES (1980); L. Wayne Scott, Issue Submission and Court's Chaqre, in STATE BAR OF
TEX., CIVIL TRIAL COURSE (1980); L. Wayne Scott, Procedural Problems dth Special Issue Submission, in
NUECES CTY. BAR Ass'N, PRESERVATION OF ERROR AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE SEMINAR
(1985); L. Wayne Scott, Oveniew, in STATE BAR OF TEX., ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL
INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES (1987); L. Wayne Scott,
Trends in the Texas Supreme Court, in STATE BAR OF TEX., SEMINAR ON PRACTICE BEFORE THE
TEXAS SUPREME COURT (2002); and L. Wayne Scott, Trends in the Texas Supreme Court, in STATE BAR
OF TEX., SEMINAR ON PRACTICE BEFORE THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT (2004). Additionally, parts
of this material have appeared in 1999 through 2016 editions of RICHARD E. FLINT & L. WAYNE
SCorr, TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPEAL (2016).
260. See Sahr v. Bierd, 92 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Mich. 1958) (exploring the "darkest of the
common-law doctrines, that of the attaint of the jury").
261. For a discussion of the developments leading up to the statutory changes, see ARIENS,
supra note 56, at 253-54.
262. Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 240 S.W. 517 (Tex. 1922), overruled by Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls,
616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
263. Texas Special Issue Act, 1913 Tex. Laws 1, ch. 59, % 1-4, at 113.
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submit each issue distinctly and separately, avoiding all intermingling; andj]
third, to give such explanation and definition of legal terms as shall be
necessary to enable the jury to answer each issue.2 6 4
The Fox court refused to approve a general contributory negligence
issue.265  This resulted in fragmented questions, leading to detailed jury
questions, or "special issues." It was not unusual for the jury charge, in a
simple two-party negligence case, to involve forty or more issues.2 6 6
In 1953, the Supreme Court of Texas was given the opportunity to
revisit narrow versus broad issues. In Roosth ' Genecov Production Co. v.
White,2 6 7 the court was faced with the issue of whether an oil derrick, as it
stood, was defective at the time it was furnished by the defendant.2 68 The
court held global, or multifarious, issues were too broad in negligence
cases but not too broad in non-negligence cases.2 6 9
In Yarborough v. Brenner,2 7 0 a child, between four and five years of age,
was struck by Brenner's car. Brenner pled both unavoidable accident and
sudden emergency.271  Rejecting the former practice, the Texas Supreme
Court held inferential rebuttal defenses, such as new and independent
cause, should not be submitted to jury as issues but should be submitted as
instructions or definitions.2 7 2 This can be said to be only a reinterpretation of
264. Fox, 240 S.W. at 521-22.
265. See id. at 522 ("Defendant in error not only objected to the single question submitted,
covering all contributory negligence issues, but requested in writing that several contributory
negligence issues be separately submitted. The court erroneously refused to submit these issues, as
the Court of Civil Appeals rightly determined.").
266. ARIENS, supra note 56, at 255.
267. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 262 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1953), overruled by ialls,
616 S.W.2d 911.
268. Id. at 100.
269. See id. at 105 (discussing the jury finding that the party's "failure to warn the plaintiff of
defects in the derrick was not negligence, and the trial court accordingly rendered judgment in his
favor'.
270. Yarbrough v. Brenner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971).
271. See GUs M. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 40 (1959) ("Although
sudden emergency issues were used before the decision in Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Darden,
that case clarified the definition of unavoidable accident, distinguishing it from sudden emergency
and other defensive theories and held that it should be submitted as an issue in tort cases, where
properly raised by pleading, proof, and proper request for inclusion in the charged. Unavoidable
accident was an inferential rebuttal issue; that is an issue which 'would disprove the existence of some
essential elements of the opponent's cause of action or affirmative defense." (citation omitted)).
272. See Yarbrmugb, 467 S.W.2d at 193 ("[U]pon retrial . . . if the evidence presents these
theories, the defendant. . . will be entitled to suitable explanatory charges or definitions which fairly
present to the jury the fact that unavoidable accident and sudden emergency may be present.
Separate issues will not be necessary.").
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the applicable rule, but it had been generally accepted in the profession
that it was to be a separate issue until the Yarborough case.2 7 3  In 1973, the
Yarborough holding became part of a broad revision of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure; thus, the prior interpretation of the applicable rule was
ignored until the rule could be changed in 1973.7
Mobile Chemical v. Be/? was decided three months after the 1973
revision to Rule 277 .27 The court held, in the context of a negligence/
res ipsa case, it was permissible to give the jury one broad negligence issue
as opposed to submitting issues on each of the many elements found in a
particular negligence case.2 7 7
The change to a broad-form submission was not without problems.
District Judge Stovall, in Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckelroy,"7  was
one of the first to submit a broad-form question in a personal injury case,
asking the jury: "Whose negligence, if any,... proximately caused the
collision ... ?"211 In an influential decision, the Houston Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment based upon the jury finding; thereafter, the
Texas Supreme Court declined the application for writ of error with an
n.r.e. designation.280
However, five years later, in Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
273. The problem of dealing with the concept of unavoidable accident has continued. See Hill
v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992) (stressing, except in certain types of cases,
courts should refrain from submitting an unavoidable accident instruction due to the risk the jury will
be misled or confused by the perception that the instruction represents a separate issue distinct from
general principles of negligence); see also Dillard v. Tex. Elec. Coop., 157 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. 2005)
(recognizing the difference of perspective among Texas authorities concerning broad form practices);
Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 477 (Tex. 1995) (Enoch, J., concurring) (expressing the view that
"the instruction should be discarded entirely'); id. (Hightower, J., dissenting) ("I would abolish the
unavoidable accident instruction, which I view as misleading, confusing and unnecessary.'.
274. See ARIENS, spra note 56, at 255 (discussing the legislative and judicial changes to the
procedural law system at that time).
275. Mobile Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
276. See id at 252-53 (holding, in the context of a negligence/res ipsa case, it was permissible to
give the jury one broad negligence issue instead of submitting issues on each of the many elements
found in a particular negligence case); see also William V. Dorsaneo, III, Broad-Form Submission of Juy
.Questions and the Standard of Reiew, 46 SMU L. REV. 601, 696 (1992) (confirming the historical
preference in Texas for a general charge rather than a detailed inquiry has since shown signs of
reversal).
277. Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 245; see Jack Pope & William Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict,
11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 1 (1979) (stressing the discretion afforded to trial judges to "determine whether
to submit issues broadly").
278. Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
279. Id. at 79.
280. Id. at 83.
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Co., 28 1 the court reversed a broad-form submission because of the
variance between the pleadings and the proof."' From Scott it was held
that it was improper to submit a broad-form question in one issue, at least
in negligence cases, where there was a variance between pleading and
proof.28 3  Separate questions, regarding each pled and proven matter,
were acknowledged to be a more appropriate method of submission.284
Two years later, in Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co.,285 the court
clarified its previous holding by stating that its position in Scott had been
misconstrued as a retreat from the revised Rule 277.286 The court
explained Scott only stood for the proposition that, where there was a case
in which there was a wide variance between what plaintiff pleaded and
what the evidence produced at trial, it was objectionable.28 7 In Brown, the
court suggested the variance problem could be corrected by coupling a
broad question that contains the limitation within it to include only
matters pled and proved;28 1 in such cases, the court observed, objections
had to be distinct and specific with the variance pointed out
specifically.28 9
The clear support for the broad-form submission came in Burk Royaly
Co. v. Walls, where the court overruled all of the cases that arose before the
1973 revisions, which followed the decision in Fox.2 90 Burk Royalty was
the decision that rejected narrow special issues in all of their many guises;
broad-form questions were required. Later decisions, such as Texas
Department ofHuman Services v. E.B.,2 9  indicated, "Mhe rule unequivocally
requires broad-form submission whenever feasible. Unless extraordinary
circumstances exist, a court must submit such broad-form questions."292
With changes in the composition of the court came a swing away from
the general broad-form special issue. The "turn around" began with the
281. Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
282. Id. at 277.
283. Id. at 277-78.
284. Id. at 278.
285. Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980).
286. Id. at 937.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 938.
289. Id.
290. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 924-25 (Tex. 1981).
291. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
292. Id. at 649; John J. Sampson, TDHS v. E.B., The Coup de Grace for Special Issue, 23 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 221, 245 (1991).
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decision in H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner,2 " which held the failure to
grant the plaintiffs tendered proper broad-form question with appropriate
instructions was error; but significantly, the error was held not harmful.2 9 4
The court explained,
Although submitted in granulated form, the jury questions contained the
proper elements of a premises liability action. Because the charge fairly
submitted to the jury the disputed issues of fact and because the charge
incorporated a correct legal standard for the jury to apply, we hold that the
trial court's refusal to submit Warner's tendered question and instructions
did not amount to harmful error.2 95
So, the broad-form issue was required, but the use of narrow issues was
not harmful error. Disjunctive submission was approved in Mustang
Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co.,"' which slightly modified the strict broad-
form concept.2 9 7  Thereafter, Cmwn Life Insurance Co. v. Casteef?9  held
broad-form issues might not always be feasible. As restated in Harris
County v. Smith,299
In Casteel, we ruled that when a single broad-form liability question
commingles valid and invalid liability grounds and the appellant's objection
is timely and specific, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when
the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an
invalid theory.30 0
Earlier, during the Texas Supreme Court's liberal period, as part of the
effort to simplify jury charges, the court had discouraged the use of
"surplus" instructions."0 ' In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lemond,302 it might have
been error to include unnecessary instructions, such an error was
harmless.3 0  Continuing the turn away from the simple broad-form
submission system, the court began to emphasize the need for instructions
293. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992).
294. Id. at 260.
295. Id.
296. Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. 2004) (per curiarn).
297. Id. at 200.
298. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000).
299. Harris Cty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2002).
300. Id. at 232-33.
301. Acord v. Gen. Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984); Lemos v. Montez,
680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984).
302. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lemond, 897 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).




to aid any broad questions submitted.3 o4  By 2009, the court, citing Texas
Workers' Compensation I surance Fund v. Mandlbauer,305 had come to the view
that "[a] trial court must, when feasible, submit a cause to the jury by
broad-form questions."3 o6 It is also required to give "such instructions
and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a
verdict."3 o "An instruction is proper if it (1) assists the jury,
(2) accurately states the law, and (3) finds support in the pleadings and
evidence."3 os Thus, the court had earlier construed the rules to limit the
use of instruction in connection with broad issues and then later re-
construed the rules to require the use of instructions.
The broad-form commandment of Rule 277 required interpretation, but
the wandering nature of the interpretations that have followed the 1973
change has created ambiguity, contradictions, burdens on parties and the
court system in general and has left the jury charge system in a constant
state of instability. It would be preferable to rewrite the rule, at least in
part.
F. Change the Interpretation (and, Thus, the Meaning of the Rule) Until a Later
Court Changes It Back and Then Solidifies It into a Rule
Of the eight routes to failure of a legal system constructed by Lon
Fuller, at least seven are illustrated by the Texas Supreme Court's handling
of the party investigative privilege. Particularly in personal injury litigation,
the right to conduct an investigation of possible accidents or events had
been protected as privileged.3 0 ' But following the 1984 amendment to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,"0 the court issued a series of
304. Lemond, 897 S.W.2d at 756.
305. Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
306. Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, LP v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855-56 (Tex. 2009)
(quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 277).
307. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 277).
308. Id. (citing Mand/bauer, 34 S.W.3d at 912).
309. "For thirty years the investigative privilege remained intact, providing absolute protection
for defendants' post-accident investigations." Alex Wilson Albright, The Texas Discovey Pniileges: A
Fool's Game?, 70 TEX. L. REV. 781, 801 (1992). "Some of the most significant changes in Texas
discovery practice in recent years have been in the area of claiming a privilege or exemption from
discovery." Carol Collins Payne, Managing Discovey Disputes: Defining 'Appropnate Discovey Requests,"
and Determining the Need to Support Objections wdth Evidence Under Rule 166b(4), 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 869,
869 (1992).
310. For articles discussing the 1984 amendments, see generally Charles W. Barrow & Jay H.
Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting Discover, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J.
713 (1984) and Ernest E. Figari, Jr., et al., Annual Survy of Texas Law: Texas Civl Procedure, 49 SMIU L.
REV. 1371 (1996).
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opinions restricting the scope of the party investigative privilege.1 Then,
in 1989, following additional rule amendments, the court in Flores v. Fourth
Court ofAppeals312 interpreted Rule 166b(3)"' of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure to establish a test for determining whether investigative
documents were prepared in "anticipation of litigation," 3 1  which
determines whether the investigative documents are protected from
pretrial discovery.
Under Flores, the investigative privilege documents would be considered
prepared in "anticipation of litigation" for purposes of Rule 166b(3) if the
documents were prepared "after there was good cause to believe suit
would be filed or after the institution of a lawsuit."3 1 s The court
explained, to determine "whether there is good cause to believe a suit will
be filed,"31 6 a two-prong analysis is required:
The first prong requires an objective examination of the facts surrounding
the investigation. Consideration should be given to outward manifestations,
which indicate litigation is imminent. The second prong utilizes a subjective
approach. Did the party opposing discovery have a good faith belief that
litigation would ensue? There cannot be good cause to believe a suit will be
filed unless elements of both prongs are present. Looking at the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the investigation, the trial court must then
determine if the investigation was done in anticipation of litigation. 3 17
The decision in Flores allowed plaintiffs to discover what had,
theretofore, been considered protected work product: post-accident
investigations conducted by parties who were later sued as a result of the
311. Turbodyne Corp. v. Heard 720 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam); Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Terry v.
Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912, 913-14 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding); Robert Ammons, Comment,
Finders Keepers No Longer the Rule: Discorey of Investhative Materials Under the Texas and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 271, 272 (1987).
312. Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding).
313. This rule is now TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5.
314. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 39-41. For a discussion of the rule changes and decisions
interpreting those rules, see William V. Dorsaneo, III, The Histog of Texas Civil Procedure, 65 BAYLOR
L. REv. 713, 778 (2013).
315. See Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 40-41 (contemplating an objective and subjective measure for
determining whether an investigation was conducted in anticipation of litigation). At the time of this
decision, the rule in place was Rule 166b(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which was
repealed in 1999 and its subject matter moved to Rule 192.5).
316. Id. at 40.
317. Id. at 40-41.
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accident.3 18
In National Tank v. Brotherton, the decision in Flores was modified:
[I]nvestigative documents are prepared in "anticipation of litigation" ... if
(a)[the objective prong] a reasonable person would have concluded from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a
substantial chance that litigation would ensue; and (b)[the subjective
prong] the party resisting discovery believed in good faith that there was a
substantial chance that litigation would ensue and conducted the
investigation for the purpose of preparing for such litigation.3 19
The court held the objective prong of Flores is satisfied whenever the
circumstances surrounding the investigation would have indicated to a
reasonable person that there was a substantial chance of litigation. 320 The
confidentiality necessary for the adversary process is not defeated because
a party, reasonably anticipating future litigation, conducts an investigation
prior to the time that litigation is "imminent."3 2 ' Thus, Flores was
modified to the extent that it accorded protection only to investigations
conducted when litigation is imminent.32 2  The underlying inquiry is
whether it was reasonable for the investigating party to anticipate litigation
and prepare accordingly.3  The second prong of the Flores test is
subjective and plainly requires that the investigation actually be conducted
for the purpose of preparing for an investigation.3 2 ' As before, the court
continues to recognize these privileges "may be overcome when the
requesting party demonstrates a substantial need for the materials and
undue hardship in obtaining the substantial equivalent of the materials by
318. See Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439, 439-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (allowing discovery of the defendant's post-accident investigation materials); Boring &
Tunneling Co. of Am. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d 284, 286-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989,
orig. proceeding) (applying the Flores two-prong test); Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation v. Davis, 775 S.W.2d 467, 472-75 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ) (following the
Flores decision). For a discussion of Scott and Salazar, see Steve E. Couch, Anicawaion of Itligaion
After National Tank Company v. Brotherton: Are We Searhing for the Truth in the Dark?, 36 Hous.
LAW. 48, July-Aug. 1998. But see Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Heard, 774 S.W.2d 316, 316-19
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (per curiam) (providing insight into the appellate
court's decision-making process days before the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Flores); see also
Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 801-02 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (illustrating a court's analysis prior to Flores).
319. Nat'l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
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other means."
In 1998, effective in 1999, the court altered the rules of civil procedure
to incorporate Brotherton into the rules.3 26  Thus, in efforts to achieve
perceived justice, the rules of procedure went through two changes
declared by the courts in just four years. These changes were not originally
evidenced in the rule but only in the court's opinions. Thus, without
warning, the interpretation of the rules changed twice, even though the
language of the rule remained the same. The swing in interpretation was
finally put to rest by the 1998 rule change.
Under the Fuller test, the court failed items four (retroactive legislation),
five (contradictions in the law), seven (unstable legislation), and eight
(divergence between adjudication and legislation).
IV. DEALING WITH COURT-CREATED PROCEDURAL DEVISES: CASE LAW
WITHOUT PROMULGATING A RULE3
2 7
Merriam Webster defines procedure as "a series of steps followed in a
regular definite order."32 8 Black's Law Dictionary defines procedure as
"[t]he mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as
distinguished from the substantive law which gives or defines the
right." 3 2 9
In some instances, the court chooses to proceed outside the realm of
directing the proceeding and enters into an area of increasing or decreasing
substantive (recoverable) rights of an individual. The court, in the instance
to be discussed below, altered the civil litigation landscape by judicial
decision-making without creating, altering, or "filtering" a rule through the
committee process. These decisions, while common law in nature,
nevertheless, have the full force and effect of rules of procedure, even if
not contained in the rule book. This is the most dangerous and potentially
political form of rulemaking. It could be called, as one writer mentioned
in another context, "Open-Ended Common Law."330  It illustrates the
325. Id. at 195.
326. See generally, Alexandra Wilson Albright, The Texas Work Product Rule, 27 ADVOC. (TEX.) 10
(2004) (describing the rule change).
327. With due apologies to John Austin.
328. Procedure, MERRIAtM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009).
329. Procedure, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
330. See David Peeples, Lawsuit Shaping and Lgal Suffiiency. The Accelerator and the Brakes of Civil
Litigaion, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 349, 349-50 (2010) ("Civil litigation ... is not limited to statutory
causes of action or those already recognized in existing case law.... [The common law is malleable
and open-textured, the civil litigant can allege almost anything.").
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period when Texas followed the national trend in litigation.3 3 '
The "prejudgment interest" turbulence33 2 of the mid-1980s illustrates
this point.3 3 3  In Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., a procedural change
was made that aided plaintiffs in negligence cases, 3 3  allowing those "who
won a judgment at trial to obtain prejudgment interest at an interest rate
much higher than the rate of inflation." 33 s The court developed new rules
for the calculation of prejudgment interest and remanded the case to the
lower court to assess the plaintiffs interest on accrued damages. 3 3 6
Mrs. Cavnar, the plaintiffs' mother, was hit by a valet driver after leaving
331. See John J. Farley, III, Robin Hood Juriprudence: The Triumph of Equity in American Tort Law,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 997, 1015-16 (1991) (discussing the cry for insurance and tort reform and
how the Texas Supreme Court's decisions altered the current rules).
332. See generally J. Caleb Rackley, A Survy of Sea-Change on the Supreme Court of Texas and Its
Turbulent Toll on Texas Tort Law, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 733 (2007) (discussing the turbulent effect of the
Supreme Court of Texas on tort law in the 1980s). However, the "turbulence" was not confined to
the issue of prejudgment interest or to the 1980s. See Phil Hardberger, juries Under Siege, 30 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1, 4 (1998) ("By 1991, conservative, activist judges had a majority on the court; ... [w]ith
this new court, previous expansions of the law were stopped, then rolled backwards. Jury verdicts
became highly suspect and were frequently overturned for a variety of ever-expanding reasons. Legal
tools of 'no duty,' 'no proximate cause,' 'no evidence,' 'insufficient evidence,' 'unreliable experts,'
'unqualified experts,' and 'junk science' wiped out many jury verdicts.").
333. See Hardberger, supra note 332, at 3 (describing the era as one where "[t]he business
community, manufacturers' associations, the interest groups representing health services and
physicians, and the insurance industry were angry; they felt betrayed by juries and by the entire
judicial process'); see also Anthony Champagne, Judidal Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 146
(1988) (arguing for judicial reform in the 1980s); Craig Enoch, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Foreword,
48 SMU L. REV. 723, 723-24 (1995) ("By now the problem highlighted seven years ago in the
60 Minutes broadcast raising the question 'Justice for Sale?' is a familiar one to most.... The
immediate focus of that story was the substantial contributions made to the presiding judge in the
[Texaco v. PennZoi| case, . . . [but] [t]he broader topic was the influence of money on judicial elections
and judicial performance." (footnotes omitted) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768,
842 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.))); Lee Shidlofsky, The Changing Face of
First-Par, Bad Faith Claims in Texas, 50 SMU L. REv. 867, 867 (1997) ("[The] expression that
'everything is bigger in Texas' certainly holds true when it comes to insurance litigation. During the
mid- to late-1980s, the judicial pendulum in Texas appeared to favor insureds, resulting in both a
large quantity of claims and large recoveries for plaintiffs. In fact, the perceived 'pro-insured' tilt of
the judicial pendulum nearly caused an insurance crisis in Texas as insurance companies
contemplated their future existence in the Lone Star State.").
334. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985) ('We therefore
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals only to the extent it denies recovery of prejudgment
interest on the damages awarded by the jury ... [o]ur holding in this case applies to all future cases as
well as those still in the judicial process involving wrongful death, survival and personal injury
actions."), abrogated byJohnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 556
(Tex. 1998).
335. ARIENs, supra note 56, at 261.
336. Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 556.
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a nightclub with her daughter. The driver hit Mrs. Cavnar, backed over
her, and then ran over her a second time before fleeing the scene.33 8 She
received severe injuries that ultimately led to her death not long after.3 39
The driver of the vehicle worked for Quality Control Parking, Inc.340 The
children of Mrs. Cavnar and the administrator of her estate brought suit
against the nightclub, the driver, and Quality Control Parking, Inc.341 The
jury awarded the plaintiffs $175,000 for "loss of affection, comfort,
companionship, society, emotional support and love in the past and which
in reasonable probability they would have received in the future," and
"$100,000 for past and future mental suffering. "3" Further damages were
awarded to the children for loss of affection, mental anguish, and loss of
services, advice, and counsel.343
The trial court refused to award the plaintiffs damages for loss of
companionship and prejudgment interest.3 4 4  The court of appeals
reversed and allowed compensation for the children's loss of
companionship and found the evidence was insufficient to support the
finding of 5% negligence attributed to the deceased.
The plaintiffs challenged the lower court's refusal to allow recovery of
prejudgment interest on damages given to them by the jury.3" The Texas
Supreme Court speculated that the lower court had refused to award
prejudgment interest based on dicta of another case.3 4 ' Noting what it
described as the erosion of this doctrine, the court concluded, "The time
has come to revise the prejudgment interest rule to make injured parties
whole and restore equity and symmetry to this area of the law. . .. To the
extent other cases conflict with this holding, they are overruled."3" The






343. Id. at 551 ("The jury further found that Linda and Steve Cavnar had each sustained
$75,000 in past and future damages for loss of affection, etc., and $50,000 in past and future damages
for mental anguish, and that each of Mrs. Cavnar's children sustained $25,000 damages for past and
future loss of services, advice, counsel and pecuniary contributions.").
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985).
347. See id. at 552 (complaining the dicta of Watkins v. Junker drove the court's decision (citing
Watkins v. Junker, 40 S.W. 11 (1897))), abmgated by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco
Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1998).
348. Id. at 553-54.
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main objective of awarding damages is to compensate an injured party not
to punish a defendant.3 49 The court formulated a revised rule concerning
prejudgment interest that they believed would restore equity and make the
plaintiffs whole.3 5 0  It held a prevailing plaintiff "may recover
prejudgment interest compounded daily (based on a 365-day year) on
damages that have accrued by the time of the judgment."3 5 ' Furthermore,
the court determined when interest would accrue on particular actions. In
wrongful death and non-death personal injury actions, interest would
begin to accrue six months after the incident that gave rise to the suit.3 5 2
In survival actions, interest would accrue as of the date of death of the
decedent or six months after the incident occurred, whichever provides
the largest award of interest.3 5 3
The court reasoned that he implementation of this new rule would
present plaintiffs with the opportunity to achieve full compensation and
that the award of prejudgment interest in personal injury suits would
ensure the acceleration of settlements and trialss.35  The delay of trials by
defendants would be avoided by extinguishing the motivation that might
tempt such actions.3 5 5  Furthermore, the court determined the accrual
time periods would avoid difficulty in prejudgment interest calculations.3 5 6
The result of Cavnar was immediate and significant.357 A personal
injury judgment, accruing interest at 10%, compounded daily, became the
best investment available. 35  Cavnar greatly added to the cost of personal
injury litigation and altered the basis upon which pre-existing liability
349. See id. at 552 ("The primary objective of awarding damages in civil actions has always been
to compensate the injured plaintiff, rather than to punish the defendant."). See generally Dean
Richard, Note, "An Award Fit for Alice in Wonderland"--Texas Allows Prejudgment Interest on Future
Damages: C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 37 Tex. SNp. Ct. J. 149 (Nov. 24, 1993), 25 TX.
TECH L. REV. 955 (1994) (arguing prejudgment interests are not compatible with the goal of
compensation).
350. Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 553-54 ("The time has come to revise the prejudgment interest rule
to make injured parties whole and restore equity and symmetry to this area of the law.").
351. Id. at 554.
352. Id. at 555.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 554.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 555.
357. See Don Wade Cloud, Jr., Note, Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.: Pnjudgment Interest
Is Now Recoverable in Personal Injury, Wrmngful Death and Sunrival Action Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 385,
385 n.3 (1986) (citing multiple cases awarding prejudgment interest at ten percent).
358. See id. (noting two cases, Albright Inc. v. Pearson and Hughes Inc. v. Gibson, both awarding
prejudgment interest at ten percent compounded daily).
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insurance policies had been calculated."' Cavnar was a rallying cry for
those seeking a more conservative Texas Supreme Court.36 o Many
perceived the Cavnar court as wrongfully supplanting legislative authority
by establishing the six-month rule controlling interest accrual. 61 This led
to a demand for legislative action to make clear any uncertainty following
Canar.362 Within two years, the Texas Legislature came up with a "tort-
reform" package that modified the most severe aspects of Cavnar.163
Thus, Cavnar failed virtually every element of the Fuller test.
In Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energ, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Texas dealt with a case that had its beginning at the time the
Cavnar decision applied and put an end to the Cavnar decision by
conforming the common law rules of Cavnar to the subsequent legislation
passed in the attempts to alter the Cavnar results: "Our common law
prejudgment interest holding applies to all cases in which judgment is
rendered on or after December 11, 1997, and to all other cases currently in
the judicial process in which the issue has been preserved."6
As stated by Robert H. Pemberton,
Regardless of the specific approach that policymakers might someday
choose, they would be well-advised to heed the foregoing lessons from the
history of Texas prejudgment interest law and avoid making "the right the
enemy of the good" in pursuing an ideal system of prejudgment interest
founded solely on economic principles or one that distinguishes between
multiple categories of claims or damages. Those who ignore the mistakes of
the past are doomed to repeat them.3 65
The court in Cavnar, assuming that what it did qualified as a rule of
359. See id. at 400-01 (discussing the effects of the Carnar decision).
360. See Hardberger, supra note 332, at 3 (discussing the want for more conservative judges on
the Texas Supreme Court).
361. See Cloud, supra note 357, at 408 (noting an overwhelming majority of jurisdiction think
the legislature is the more appropriate body to decide if and in what amount any prejudgment interest
should be awarded).
362. Id.
363. See ARIENS, supra note 56, at 272 ("In both the regular session and in a special session in
1987, the Texas Legislature adopted a number of provisions intended to produce tort reform in
Texas."); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, 'f to the Races": The 1980s Tort Cris and The Law Reform
Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 210 (1990) ("Texas thereby joined the great majority of states, which
enacted tort reform legislation between 1985 and 1988.").
364. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 532 (Tex.
1988).
365. Robert H. Pemberton, A Guide to Recent Changes and New Challenges in Texas Pejudgment
Interest Law, 30 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 71, 138 (1999).
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procedure, violated each of the Fuller elements described above.
V. SUMMARY
A. The Dilemmas Reviewed
Up to this point, this Article has presented the proposition that the
Texas Rules of Procedure should, in general, be interpreted as written and
clarified over time by decisions that make the rules fair and functional.
The rules, as they have been interpreted over time, provide great elasticity
when a party, for example, fails to answer a citation and seeks to set aside a
default judgment, is late in taking any action, or when a clerical error
occurs. Yet, as illustrated, the application of certain rules does present
dilemmas because literal application may result in perceived injustice. It
has been the purpose of this Article to suggest ways of dealing with these
dilemmas.
B. Suggestions for Resolving the Dilemma of Rule Interp relation
1. At the Trial Level
Trial courts should first inquire as to whether the problem involves
jurisdiction. If it does not, the court is generally required to give the party
an opportunity to correct the deficiency. If the problem is not subject to
correction, after the court loses jurisdiction, the trial court has no choice
but to dismiss the case. Even then, nunc pro tunc and bill of review
procedures remain available to restart the trial court's jurisdiction. If the
matter is not one of jurisdiction, the trial judge has great discretion to give
the fairest interpretation possible and will only be reversed if that
discretion is abused.
2. At the Appellate Level
At the appellate level, it is a different story. The litigants have had their
day in court, subject to review for preserved or, the rare, fundamental
error.
When faced with the dilemma of interpretation at the appellate level, the
first inquiry should be whether it relates to the invocation or continuation
of the appellate court's power; or, is it a matter of procedure that has
effect on the determination of an issue.
If it is a matter of jurisdictional power, is the dilemma caused by
extreme circumstances not anticipated by the rules-in effect, a lacuna in
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the law, beyond the control of the party involved-or is it a correctable
mistake missed by the party? In Burkitt v. Glenney, the existing law had not
foreseen a possible statewide event (actually nationwide following the
Kennedy assassination) that made the conventional courthouse physical
filing of a jurisdictionally necessary document impossible. The dilemma
was not caused by the party but by the event. To deny jurisdiction in this
situation would have resulted in, what Lon Fuller refers to as, a "silly"
interpretation of the existing law. 6 6 Thus, if the issue is one of
jurisdiction and the dilemma is caused by internal factors attributable to
the party, the courts should enforce the rules as written; but if the dilemma
is caused by external events, it is more proper to "do justice."
If the matter relates to jurisdiction and the mistake is of a clerical nature,
the party should be allowed to correct the error. Thus, the Texas Supreme
Court has had no problem in the last thirty-plus years correcting obvious
attorney/party mistakes that do not reflect a lack of intent to act. In City of
San Antonio v. Rodrgue7)67 the appealing party placed the wrong cause
number on the notice of appeal-all other information being correctly
stated. While the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court reinstated the appeal:
We have held that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal when
the appellant files an instrument that is "a bona fide attempt to invoke
appellate court jurisdiction." More recently, we reaffirmed the policy that
"the decisions of the courts of appeals [should] turn on substance rather
than procedural technicality." Here, there can be no doubt that the City's
attempt to perfect an appeal was "bona fide" because, but for the erroneous
cause number, the City's notice of appeal complied with the provisions of
Tex. R. App. P. 40(a) (2). We hold that the City's notation of the incorrect
cause number on its notice of appeal does not defeat the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals. 3 6 8
This was akin to the correction of a clerical error (as opposed to
366. See generally FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 73 (providing insight into Fuller's
views); D'Amato, supra note 73 (examining Fuller's theories together with substantive natural law).
But see Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 73, at 369 (describing the term adjudication in the broadest
sense of the word, as well as the multiple forms); Moffat, supra note 73 at 296 (describing "the
general methodological positions that Professor Fuller found it necessary to reject and to explore the
reasons for his rejection of them"); see also Fuller, supra note 63, at 630 (rejecting Professor H.L.A.'s
statutory interpretation theory).
367. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
368. Id. at 418 (citations omitted) (first alterations in original) (first quoting Grand Prairie
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. S. Parts Imports, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); and then
quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gonzales, 820 S.W.2d 121, 121 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)).
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judicial) in a final judgment, which may be made even after plenary power
has otherwise expired.
When the dilemma is brought about by party mistake, the question
becomes whether a procedural "safety net" (a means for the party to
correct its own mistake) exists. If it does, that safety net should be the
party's remedy. If the correction alters the result of the appeal in favor of
the party creating the mistake, it is more egregious. In both ways the court
in Verburgt v. Dorner exceeded its jurisdictional power and compounded
that error by granting similar relief to all parties in the future, thus
modifying the established rules. Here, it runs afoul of the modified-Fuller
test. While there can be sympathy for the view that minor procedural
mistakes should not control outcomes, when the mistake is not
jurisdictional, there is no room for sympathy when the error relates to a
court exceeding its power 3 6 9-particularly if the correction alters the
outcome of the appeal and, more so, if it is applied to all appealing parties,
thus modifying the rule without altering the rule. Without the proper
transfer of power from the trial courts to the courts of appeal and the
courts of appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, there is no jurisdiction for
the appellate courts to decide anything. The mistake in Verburgt cannot be
classified as a clerical mistake as was the mistake in RodngueZ. Nor can it
be considered a ministerial mistake, such as failing to pay a filing fee.370
369. Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. 2014) (citing In re United
Servs. Auto Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)).
370. See Tate v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 934 S.W.2d 83, 83 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)
(finding the filing of a post-judgment motion without paying the filing fee results in the trial court's
plenary power being extended, thus also extending the appellate timetable if filing fee is paid within
the period of plenary power). "[The failure to pay the [filing] fee before the motion [for new trial] is
overruled by operation of law may forfeit altogether the movant's opportunity to have the trial court
consider the motion . . . ." Id. at 84. Regarding the failure to pay the filing fee, however, the court
failed to express an opinion on whether the failure to pay retroactively invalidated the conditional
filing for purposes of the appellate timetable. That was laid to rest, and properly so, in Garta v.
Garia; there, Garcia timely filed a motion for new trial but never paid the fee. See Garza v. Garcia
137 S.W.3d 36, 37 (Tex. 2004) (holding a motion for new trial extends appellate timetables even if the
requisite filing fee is never paid). Further, the court noted it
construe[s] the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberally, so that decisions turn on substance rather
than procedural technicality; nothing in those rules requires a fee to accompany a motion for
new trial, or that such a fee be paid at all. Moreover, once a motion for new trial is
conditionally filed and timetables extended, all litigants benefit from knowing what timetables
apply even if they do not know whether the requisite fee was paid. The alternative would breed
uncertainty, as the deadlines might automatically jump forward when the fee is quietly paid or
revert backwards if it is not.
This is not to say filing fees are irrelevant. [The court has] held that 'absent emergency or
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Rather, the omission of the required motion was the failure to meet a
condition precedent to a rule that allowed correction of a party mistake in
missing a timetable.
In Burkitt v. Glenney, the action of the court, to disregard the
jurisdictional error, did not alter the outcome of the litigation. In Verbuirt,
the court allowed the party to continue on with the appeal.
Sub-Inquiry: Is the dilemma due to the complexity of a rule, a lacuna in
the rules, or is this a matter of political or jurisprudential concern?
If the problem is the result of the complexity of a rule, the courts have
several means for dealing with various levels of complexity. In those
situations, the rule should be corrected by amendment not interpretation.
If a lacuna-as in the failure to foresee a problem-such as in Akers v.
Simpson, the courts should apply the rule as written and amend the rule as
quickly as possible. If a political matter, such as prejudgment interest, the
Texas Supreme Court should not venture into the swamp of politics; to do
so is to make the Texas Supreme Court appear to be something other than
a judicial body. If a jurisprudential matter, the question becomes whether
the problem is due to the court's own prior interpretations.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Proposalfor Dealing with Dilemmas in Interpreting Rules-Elastic Formalism
While a plain or formal interpretation of the rules of procedure should
be the general rule, as in Akers, when outside forces produce a problem
beyond the ability of a party to correct, there should be a possible remedy
to correct the injustice. Silly results that are not the fault of the party
should be subject to judicial correction. This includes recognition of
clerical errors and the easy correction of those errors.
However, when the formal interpretation is predictable and within the
language of the rule, the rule should be applied as written and amended to
provide for relief in the future. This should be the general rule. The
dilemmas are then the product of a party not knowing the law or
employing an attorney who is not well trained in the law. It is not for the
other rare circumstances' a motion for new trial should not be considered until the filing fee is
paid. Here, Garcia's factual sufficiency complaint had to be raised in a motion for new trial, but
because she never paid the $15 fee, the trial court was not required to review it.... [Thus,
[because no new trial fee was ever paid], the court of appeals correctly never addressed
[Garcia's] factual sufficiency complaint, but correctly considered her venue complaint.
Id at 38 (footnotes omitted).
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courts to save parties from their own mistakes.
Some rules are general and, by their nature, require a form of common
law development by the courts. Rules that are complex but specific,
however, should be followed until amended. The intrusion of political
aims into procedural interpretation, such as interpreting prejudgment
interest and the scope of the investigative privilege, invites a political
response with the electorate choosing to change the composition of the
court. This result is instability and uncertainty in the application of the
rules. This is not proper.
If existing procedural rules are too complicated, they should be
amended through the process for formal amendment. Attempts to
simplify the rules by opinion have the potential to invite subsequent
responses that result in a re-reading of the re-reading of the rules. This is
not a proper way to handle rules.
As stated early in this Article, judging is not easy. Deciding a given case
using a rule of procedure may appear to result in injustice. Judging will be
easier if the rules are, or should be, written in a manner that is elastic and
friendly, with that elasticity becoming more and more rigid as a party
approaches a final judgment. After the entry of the judgment, the current
procedural structure provides means for the correction of preserved
errors.3 7 1 Those "means for correction" become more rigid as the litigant
progresses through the appellate process-down to the number of words
that may be used in a petition for review.3 7 2 Courts of appeal are given
the power to review factual sufficiency.373 After the review power passes
to the Texas Supreme Court, that factual sufficiency review ends (or at
least it is supposed to) and only legal sufficiency and law questions can be
reviewed. 3 7  Such is the nature of the procedural pyramid.
It is important to remember the civil dispute system exists to resolve
conflict. Once the parties bring their dispute, or disputes, to the courts for
resolution, the pursuit is for a final judgment that ends the dispute. As the
parties progress from the final judgment of one court to a review by
another, the appellate courts must remember the goal of resolving disputes
in a timely and orderly fashion; the end being a final enforceable judgment.
There should be, and are, ways to deal with the dilemmas that face judges
and courts. However, it is best left to the rules, leaving room for a small
371. TEx. R. Civ. P. 1.
372. TEx. R. APP. P. 9.4(h)(i)(2)(A).
373. Id. R. 38.2(b).
374. Id. R. 58.1.
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bit of judicial elasticity.
B. Final Thoughts
It is proposed that he Texas courts, particularly the Supreme Court of
Texas, avoid ad hoc application of secondary rules, primarily Rule 1.
Secondary rules should not be used to alter the direct language in primary
rules except in the most extraordinary of circumstances that do not result
from the fault of the party. The courts should openly (with full discussion
in the appellate opinion) consider the eight factors drawn from Fuller's
routes to the failure of a legal system whenever the problem of applying
secondary rules to primary rules arises.
After applying the Fuller test to the situations described above, it can be
seen that "justice" can be achieved in an orderly fashion if certain rules are
observed.3 s
375. As applied to interpreting rules, the Fuller test can be restated for this purpose as follows:
The Elastic Rules for Resolving a Dilemma between a Stated Rule and "Achieving Justice."
(1) Lacuna: Is there a lacuna or vacancy in the law that justifies the resolution?
(2) Publication: Is this a single correction of the rule, or will this resolution be published to
effect future litigation?
(3) Ambiguity: Will resolution of this dilemma be unclear and/or create an ambiguity in the law?
If so, will this variations be published and made known as a Rule of Law?
(4) Retroactive: Is this retroactive legislation?
(5) Contradiction: Will this resolution create a contradiction between the published result and
the rule?
(6) Too much: Will this resolution create unreasonable demands upon the litigants or the courts
that is demands beyond the power of either litigations or the courts?
(7) Instability: Will this resolution create instability in the law?
(8) Divergence: Is this resolution a divergence between this resolution and the published rules?
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